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Article
A Return to the States’ Rights Model:
Amending the Constitution’s Most Controversial
and Misunderstood Provision
MEG PENROSE
This Article seeks to return to the intent of the Symposium, which was
to stimulate a meaningful dialogue on the modern Second Amendment.
More specifically, it proposes a return to the states’ rights model that
predated the Supreme Court’s narrow decisions in District of Columbia v.
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago by using the Article V process set
forth directly in the Constitution to address modern concerns about
firearms. The proposal flows from a healthy skepticism about the role of
the federal government in interpreting gun regulations, as well as a desire
to avoid the inevitable follow-up decisions from a very fractured and often
unpredictable Supreme Court.
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A Return to the States’ Rights Model:
Amending the Constitution’s Most Controversial
and Misunderstood Provision
MEG PENROSE*
“A mere change in public opinion since the adoption of the
Constitution, unaccompanied by a constitutional amendment,
should not change the meaning of the Constitution.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DILEMMA
The Second Amendment is a mere twenty-seven words, though most
people only recognize the last fourteen of them: “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”2 What do these words, taken
together, really mean? And do they mean something different today than
they did in the eighteenth century when they were first written, debated,
rewritten, and, ultimately, ratified? Can we, in the twenty-first century,
rely solely on the text to ensure what the Second Amendment really
protects?
Before embarking on what will undoubtedly be a controversial
proposal, I want to be clear that this Article is not anti-gun, anti-military,
anti-American, or anti-anything. Neither is the author, who is in the
process of securing a concealed handgun license. This proposal does not
call for any governmental agency to disarm any individual or group of
individuals. Neither does the author. Rather, the proposal takes a look at
recent Second Amendment jurisprudence with a healthy skepticism about
the role of the federal government—and particularly the U.S. Supreme
*

Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Professor Penrose teaches
Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, and other courses that relate to the Constitution. She also
actively practices constitutional law in federal court. She recently completed citizen police training and
is in the process of obtaining her concealed handgun license. Professor Penrose is hugely indebted to
her extended family for always indulging her by reading and commenting on her numerous drafts of
her articles and essays. In addition, Professor Penrose gratefully acknowledges the generous
contributions from Professors Robert H. Churchill, Robert Cottroll, and Mark Tushnet. Each of these
gentlemen graciously provided advice and guidance in dealing with this complicated, checkered
history. Thank you to Dean Aric Short and other Texas A&M Law Professors for their support and
friendship.
1
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696–97
(1976).
2
U.S. CONST. amend II.

1466

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1463

Court—in interpreting gun regulations. And, contrary to criticism that
followed the Symposium, the proposal does not undermine constitutional
integrity or sanctity. Instead, this proposal, which seeks a return to the
states’ rights model that predated the Supreme Court’s narrow decisions in
District of Columbia v. Heller3 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,4 uses the
Article V process set forth directly in the Constitution to address modern
concerns.5
The Founders knew that society would change in ways they could
never have imagined. Thus, in their great design, they provided us with the
means to change the Constitution in a manner that would enable this
Constitution to outlive not only their grand vision but, likely, all of us and
our vision as well. The Article V process has been used on several
occasions to provide us with twenty-seven amendments to the original
Constitution.6 And, interestingly enough, the Second Amendment itself is
a product of the Article V process.7
To be clear, any desire by individuals or groups to amend our
Constitution is not anti-American nor counter-culture. Rather, Article V
solutions are being asserted by scholars and groups on both the left and
right sides of the political spectrum. From the Goldwater Institute’s call
for utilizing Article V to secure a Balanced Budget Amendment,8 to
broader calls for holding a constitutional convention9 (something this
author opposes), Article V appears to be gaining traction—or at least
attention—in our modern society.
Our federal system is broken and most Americans hold little faith in
the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government. Approval
3

554 U.S. 570 (2008).
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
5
See U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . .”). Article V is the
“Amendment” provision of the Constitution and affords modern generations the opportunity to update,
correct, or otherwise alter our nearly 230-year-old Constitution.
6
For a historical discussion of the Article V process and examples of its application, see generally
S. DOC. No. 112-9, at 987–1001 (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN2013/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2013.pdf.
7
See Rod Taylor, Note, A New Look at Article V and the Bill of Rights, 6 IND. L. REV. 699, 705–
06 (1973) (discussing the reasons Article V was employed to amend the Bill of Rights).
8
For various resources discussing the Goldwater Institute’s proposal, see Compact for a Balanced
Budget, GOLDWATER INST. (Nov. 20, 2013), http://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/compact-balancedbudget.
9
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, What Are We to Do About Dysfunction? Reflections on Structural
Constitutional Change and the Irrelevance of Clever Lawyering, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1127, 1132–33
(2014) (contending that a constitutional convention is necessary, despite contrary arguments that
judicial interpretations can safeguard evolving values).
4
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ratings for these entities are nearing all-time lows. With no prospect of
solutions being produced by the federal government, the promise of
Article V and use of the state convention model appears enticing. Our
Constitution was intended to change and, in fact, it did change immediately
upon ratification with the addition of a corresponding Bill of Rights. This
great promise, of an enduring yet adaptive Constitution, allows us to
engage in healthy debate about the rights we hold dear. We should seek
ways to enshrine those rights more permanently in our Constitution, rather
than wait for the fluctuating decisions of the Supreme Court to define a
particular right’s parameters.
Such robust debate was expected, if not encouraged, by the Founders.
Unfortunately, modern society often chooses to forgo debate, choosing
instead to use invectives and harassing communications to shut off
uncomfortable conversations. This Symposium attempted to jump start the
healthy debate by inviting scholars and participants to discuss, debate, and
assess the modern Second Amendment. Unfortunately, immediately
following this Symposium, many individuals either misunderstood the
dialogue being shared or sought to advance a different agenda—one not
interested in healthy debate or meaningful dialogue.
This Article seeks to return to the Symposium’s intent, which was to
stimulate a meaningful dialogue on the modern Second Amendment.
Readers may disagree with the Article’s thesis, which proposes a return to
the states’ rights model to avoid the inevitable follow-up decisions from a
very fractured and sometimes unpredictable Supreme Court. This author
takes the states’ rights approach—one usually championed by many of the
most ardent gun owners in this country.
Hopefully, patience with the thesis will enable readers to appreciate
that this Article is neither anti-gun nor anti-Constitution. The author has
most assuredly evolved since the Symposium and hopes that this Article
will evidence her belief that states are in a far better position than the
Supreme Court to delimit any restrictions placed on gun ownership or
usage. The author fears that if matters are left to the Supreme Court, any
future restrictions will be far more limiting and, even worse, nationalized,
despite local democratic movements that prefer differing regulations. As a
proud Texan, this Author believes that her state and all others are in far
superior positions to assess their citizens’ local needs than the U.S.
Supreme Court. Others are, of course, free to disagree.
The Second Amendment is being used herein as a vehicle for
discussing the broader issue of states’ rights. Will we become a nation that
has its most controversial and divisive issues decided at the state or
10
Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans’ Trust in Government Generally Down this Year, GALLUP POL.
(Sept. 26, 2013).
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national level? If we push them onto the national stage, we risk losing
those rights that may seem clear from the text of the Constitution, but
nevertheless are subject to interpretation from nine unelected Justices. As
Chief Justice Marshall admonished in McCulloch v. Maryland,11 the
Constitution provides but an outline of our rights, subject, always, to being
construed by the Supreme Court:
A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all
the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably
never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore,
requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of
the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the
framers of the American constitution, is not only to be
inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the
language. Why else were some of the limitations, found in
the 9th section of the 1st article, introduced? It is also, in
some degree, warranted, by their having omitted to use any
restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and
just interpretation. In considering this question, then, we
must never forget that it is a Constitution we are
expounding.12
The Supreme Court, not the Constitution, established the concept of
judicial review.13 Nowhere in the Constitution is this power set forth in the
text, but the power has been firmly retained by the Court since its
pronouncement in 1803 that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”14 Thus, as this Article
unfolds, it can only be hoped that readers will appreciate the vantage point
of the author: The Constitution will continue to be expounded by the
Supreme Court. Without clear protections for a states’ rights approach to
gun ownership and rights, the Supreme Court will ultimately hold the final
say regarding any particular regulation, state or federal.
Such interpretive delegation is not favored by this author, particularly
in light of the very tenuous nature of recent gun cases. The Supreme Court
did not declare that an individual right to “keep and bear arms” exists until
11

17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 407.
13
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803).
14
Id. at 177.
12
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2008.
That conclusion, made in a narrowly divided 5–4 decision,16
suggests continuing uncertainty in our Second Amendment jurisprudence.
While some might be content to rest upon the nascent case law, this author
prefers keeping the power of regulation at the state level where local
democracy is far better suited to meet the unique needs of each local
population. Undoubtedly, questions of gun regulation and ownership will
continue to be defined. The current system, however, leaves the
constitutionality of each regulation subject to Supreme Court review. An
amendment that returns the power of regulation to the states would insulate
them from potential overreaching by any particular Supreme Court.
For these reasons, this Author would like to see Article V used to
return the issue of gun rights and regulations to the individual states. The
proffered amendment, as set forth herein, insures the continuing viability
of lawful gun ownership. The main alteration is that this proposal takes the
power of judicial review regarding state regulations away from the
Supreme Court. Each of us must place our trust somewhere. This author
retains more trust in the local democracy of states’ rights.
Scholars have called the Second Amendment “embarrassing,”17
“ironic,”18 and “radical,”19 and have even noted the racist origins of gun
control laws.20 Most Americans will tell you that the “right of the people
to keep and bear arms” means that they have the constitutional right to
own a gun.21 Such an understanding is incomplete, at best.22 Moreover,
that view is arguably divorced from the text and history of the Second
Amendment.23 One cannot possibly discuss the Second Amendment, what
15

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
Id. at 572.
17
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). Professor
Levinson’s article remains the seminal scholarly piece on the Second Amendment. Most scholars and
historians credit Professor Levinson’s article with instigating the modern surfeit of Second Amendment
scholarship. See Jill Lepore, The Lost Amendment, NEW YORKER (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/04/the-second-amendment.html (describing
Levinson’s article as “a plea for reasoned debate” and designating it as one of several catalysts of
renewed Second Amendment discourse).
18
Saul Cornell, The Ironic Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 292 (2008).
19
Eugene Volokh, The Radical Amendment, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2002, at A10.
20
Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (1995).
21
74% Think
Americans
Have Constitutional
Right
to Own
a
Gun,
RASMUSSEN REP. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_eve
nts/gun_control/74_think_americans_have_constitutional_right_to_own_a_gun.
22
Historian Robert H. Churchill explains that there was undoubtedly a right to keep arms during
colonial times. That right, however, was directly connected to the duty of the “body politic” to remain
prepared for armed militia duty. Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right
to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV.
139, 141–42 (2007).
23
Id. at 141–47. “In every colony of British North America, militia laws required that these
militiamen provide their own arms unless they were too poor to do so. Taken together, probate
inventories and extant militia returns and gun censuses demonstrate that most white men in American
16
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it protects, or how to improve it without appreciating its origin.
This Article will delve into the origins, text, and early case law
interpreting the Second Amendment to demonstrate that our modern
understanding of these twenty-seven words has ventured so far from the
Founders’ design that we must do something innovative to protect the
rights we hold so dear. We must, through the Article V amendment
process, excise the first thirteen words that seem less relevant to our
modern world. Our twenty-first-century focus centers on the right “to keep
and bear Arms,” wholly removed from the prefatory clause explaining that
“a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,”
requires something.25 What that something is no longer seems relevant
because we are not living in the Founders’ world. We do not have militias
and really do not worry about whether these obsolescent forces are well or
poorly regulated. We care about guns. Deeply. Religiously. And the
current Second Amendment’s phraseology seems to only hinder our efforts
to have meaningful conversations about the depth and breadth of an
individual’s right “to keep and bear arms.” We can continue on the path of
affording the constitutional interpretation to the Supreme Court. Or, we
can adapt the Amendment to meet the needs of a much different, modern
world.
Part II of this Article traces the history of the founding generation,
having been both victimized by and proponents of selective disarmament.
Our current Second Amendment should have numerous footnotes attached
to the fourteen words protecting the right to “keep and bear arms,” thereby
ensuring that both lawyers and historians appreciate the true origin of this
limited right.26 Regulations have always been a part of gun ownership in

owned guns . . . .” Id. at 147. Professor Churchill explains that most white males were expected, if not
required, to “keep arms.” Id. at 147–49. The fact that Professor Churchill’s scholarship demonstrates a
right to “keep arms” does not necessarily support the majority opinion in District of Columbia v.
Heller, which suggests that keeping and bearing arms are and were intended to be synonymous. 554
U.S. 570, 582–86 (2008). Heller is where history and text may begin to part ways.
24
It is also critical to note that at least one historian’s research has been roundly criticized for a
lack of demonstrable accuracy. Michael Bellesiles published regularly in this area, but has
subsequently been challenged for his historical reliability. See James Lindgren, Book Review, Fall
From Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195, 2197 (2002) (“Since
the book’s publication, scholars who have checked the book’s claims against its sources have
uncovered an almost unprecedented number of discrepancies, errors, and omissions.”).
25
U.S. CONST. amend II; see also Churchill, supra note 22, at 172 (“We have very few
eighteenth-century commentaries on the meaning of the final draft of the Second Amendment.”).
26
While Professor Churchill indicates that “at no time between 1607 and 1815 did the colonial or
state governments of what would become the first fourteen states exercise a police power to restrict the
ownership of guns by members of the body politic,” Churchill, supra note 22, at 142, this “body
politic” strictly meant able-bodied white males. The issue of ownership was quite clearly distinct from
the issue of use as both colonial and state legislatures strictly regulated the use of weaponry. White
men could “keep arms” but they were not always free to “use” arms. Id. at 172–74.
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this country. The debate has never been about whether such ownership
rights exist but, rather, which governmental entities are entrusted to
promulgate regulations and interpret them.
Part III introduces the “collective rights” and “standard model”
approaches to Second Amendment analysis. Each approach claims to have
the more accurate view of history. But, as we move further away from
originalism and become more comfortable with a “living Constitution,”
Part III inquires whether history really matters in this dialogue at all.
These historical mysteries, or inconsistencies, merely give further credence
to the need for amending and improving the Second Amendment to reflect
the modern approach, all while returning power to the states rather than
relying on the U.S. Supreme Court and its ever-changing composition.
Part IV addresses the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Heller and
McDonald. Prior to 2008, the Second Amendment had lain dormant for
seven decades.28 The Court’s current treatment of the Second Amendment
proves the vulnerability of leaving interpretation of our “living
Constitution” solely to the province of the judicial department. With a
bitterly divided Supreme Court, it is likely that we have not heard its last
word on the meaning of the Second Amendment. This uncertainty should
give pause to even the most ardent supporter of gun rights.
Part V provides this author’s solution to the current Second
Amendment dilemma. Rather than battle over whether the Second
Amendment’s militia clause means anything, the time has come to draft an
entirely new amendment that protects lawful gun owners in a clear manner.
Our current Second Amendment means only part of what it says, as a
functioning Militia has long been absent from American society. Our
Founders provided us with the ideal tool to ameliorate outdated language,
avoid confused interpretations, and modernize the protections afforded by
our Constitution. Article V was put in the Constitution to permit future
generations to revise the Constitution to address concerns the Founders
never could have envisioned or anticipated. Article V gave us the Second
Amendment. Article V gave us the Bill of Rights. While it may feel
uncomfortable to rely on Article V, this author believes that Article V
provides an excellent opportunity for modern society to improve our great
Constitution, rather than continuing to rely upon the Supreme Court to
define the parameters of lawful gun ownership.
But first, we must convince ourselves that what remains in place is
unworkable. While many might disapprove of this proposal, I wonder
whether anyone in this country is content or secure with relying on our
27
See id. at 143 (“Hundreds of individual statutes regulated the possession and use of guns in
colonial and early national America.”).
28
The last significant challenge to the Second Amendment was in United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174 (1939).
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current paradigm to interpret the Second Amendment. The conversation
about gun rights and regulations is growing more frequent. Both sides
want change and assurances, neither having found sufficient solace in the
existing Second Amendment. The author’s personal experience is that
most individuals agree there is a pre-existing right to own weaponry,
particularly guns. But, as regulations persist in this area, we must ask
which entity is best suited to solve the needs of the people and,
particularly, lawful gun owners: the Supreme Court or state legislatures?
The author’s answer to this question propels a states’ rights solution.
II. HISTORICAL REALITIES
For all the cries of constitutional heritage, one thing is certain: the
Second Amendment’s “right to keep and bear arms” was nowhere
catalogued in the Declaration of Independence as a grievance against King
George III.29 The Third Amendment’s quartering of soldiers was clearly
articulated.30 The threat posed by standing armies was also mentioned.31
There were even comments regarding the slave trade, later omitted.32 But,
for all the claims of historical pedigree, the so-called individual right to
“keep and bear arms”—currently disconnected from its contextual
affiliation with the militia—was apparently not the impetus for calling
forth the American Revolution.33

29
See Peter Buck Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 NW. U.
L. REV. 46, 53 (1967) (“Apparently, no grievance leading or contributing to the [American] Revolution
involved the disarming of an individual, and no evidence shows that either the populace or the
revolutionary leaders conceived any individual right to bear arms as having been violated by British
colonial policy.”).
30
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 16 (U.S. 1776) (“For quartering large bodies
of armed troops among us . . . .”).
31
See id. at para. 13 (“He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the
consent of our legislatures.”).
32
Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s “original Rough draught” of the Declaration of Independence, in
1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1760–1776, at 423–28 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).
Jefferson’s first draft of the Declaration of Independence chastised King George III because:

[H]e has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating it’s most sacred
rights of life & liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him,
captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur
miserable death in their transportation thither. this piratical warfare, the opprobrium
of infidel powers, is the warfare on the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain,
determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold . . . .
Id. at 426. These comments were later excised by the broader committee working on the Declaration of
Independence. Tania Tetlow, The Founders and Slavery: A Crisis of Conscience, 3 J. LOY. PUB. INT.
L. 1, 11 (2001).
33
See Feller & Gotting, supra note 29, at 53 (“The battles of Lexington and Concord were not
engendered by the British intentions to disarm a single man, but rather their move to disarm the
militia.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 109 (2002)
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Instead, most historians and legal observers trace the roots of our
Second Amendment back to the English Bill of Rights and the colonists’
fear of a standing army.34 Neither hunting nor self-protection, individually
speaking, motivated the Founders to create the Second Amendment.35
Rather, the right to arms—both English and colonial—stemmed from
militia obligations and was always, absolutely always, conditioned on
being an able-bodied, white male, usually of a particular religious faith.36
Militias, it was believed, provided the best defense against standing armies
and tyranny.37
Fear likewise motivated another colonial stance toward weaponry:
selective disarmament. As suggested by the Declaration of Independence,
which spoke disparagingly of the “Indian savages,”38 the Colonies
distrusted Native Americans and outlawed them from having arms and
munitions.39 Despite Thomas Jefferson’s initial statements of offense
regarding slavery in the draft Declaration of Independence, blacks—both
free and slave—were precluded from keeping or bearing arms due to a fear
that their arming would undermine, if not abolish, the institution of

(explaining the connection between the Second Amendment and the desire to prevent the “king’s men”
from having the only arms).
34
E.g., Feller & Gotting, supra note 29, at 53.
35
William G. Merkel, A Cultural Turn: Reflections on Recent Historical and Legal Writing on the
Second Amendment, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 671, 680 (2006).
36
For example, the Second Congress limited militia service to “each and every free able-bodied
white male citizen . . . who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five
years.” Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271; see also United States v. Tooley, 717 F.
Supp. 2d 580, 589 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (“While religious tolerance was higher in the colonies, at least
some scholars believe that certain colonies disarmed their Catholic population.”).
37
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The
Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States to
maintain a well-regulated militia. . . . [as] a response to concerns raised during the ratification of the
Constitution that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national standing army
posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several States.”).
38
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 28 (U.S. 1776). King George was condemned by
colonists for exciting “domestic insurrections amongst us, and [endeavoring] to bring on the inhabitants
of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished
destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.” Id.
39
See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an AfroAmericanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 319 (1991) (“The English distrust of the lower classes,
and then certain religious groups, was replaced in America by a distrust of two racial minorities: Native
Americans and blacks.”); David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic
Context for the Historical Meaning of “the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms,” 22 LAW &
HIST. REV. 119, 152–53 (2004) (noting that New Hampshire had exempted “Quakers, Negroes, Indians,
and Mulattoes, among others, from [state] militia service” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cottrol
and Diamond further explain that “an armed and universally deputized white population was necessary
not only to ward off dangers from the armies of other European powers, but also to ward off attacks
from the indigenous population.” Cottrol & Diamond, supra, at 324.
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40

slavery. Early Americans thus engaged in the same form of selective
disarmament that English Protestants engaged in when disarming the
Catholics.41 Targeted disarmament of discrete minority populations was
regularly practiced both before and after the ratification of the Second
Amendment.42 All of this illustrates that certain categories of people,
though changing in description, have always been subjectively deemed too
dangerous, too radical, or too unpredictable to have weaponry.43 Even
today, Justice Scalia speaks of “the longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . [and] laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”44
The Founders knew all too well that arms were power and
disarmament kept mischief, particularly from “undesirable” individuals, at
bay.45 So in many ways, fear—of a standing army and of the
untrustworthy—was the motivation for early American gun laws. While
ironically clamoring for a right to “keep and bear arms” as a defense
against tyranny, the Founders and colonial legislators ensured that those
who might challenge the white hierarchy of our nascent democracy would
not have access to the very weaponry that seemed so vital, at least
rhetorically, to the nation’s survival.46 Our Constitution, in its original
40
See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 39, at 324 (“An armed white population was also essential
to maintain social control over blacks and Indians who toiled unwillingly as slaves and servants in
English settlements.” (footnote omitted)); supra note 32 (citing Jefferson’s remarks).
41
Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of
the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should be Incorporated in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 398–403 (2009); Nelson Lund, The Past and
Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 10–11(1996); see supra note 36 (observing
that Catholics were likely disarmed by colonists).
42
See United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580, 589 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (“It is apparently
undisputed that other classes of early Americans, including Native Americans, free blacks, and those
who refused to swear a loyalty oath, were often restricted from owning firearms.”). Tooley presents an
exceptional historical explanation of firearm regulation and the Second Amendment. Id. at 587–92.
43
Id. at 588–90. Our English ancestors regularly disarmed individuals believed to be “dangerous
to the Peace of the Kingdome.” Id. at 589 (quoting Charles, supra note 41, at 365) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Likewise, “it is clear that the colonists, at least in some manner, carried on the English
tradition of disarming those viewed as ‘disaffected and dangerous.’” Id. at 590. The tradition of taking
firearms away from racial minorities persisted after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and
through the black codes and Jim Crow laws. Cramer, supra note 20, at 20–21. In the 1960s, California
was motivated by the Black Panthers’ open and armed protest activities to pass restrictive gun
legislation. Id. at 21.
44
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
45
See Don Higginbotham, The Second Amendment in Historical Context, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
263, 267 (1999) (noting the legislative efforts to “disarm those socially undesirable persons such as
Catholics, white servants, and Africans (both slaves and free blacks) who might somehow acquire
weapons”).
46
See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 39, at 319 (“The English distrust of the lower classes, and
then certain religious groups, was replaced in America by a distrust of two racial minorities: Native
Americans and blacks.”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second Amendment and
the Failure of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167, 184 (2000) (“The Second Amendment may
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47

form, offered far from an egalitarian right to arms. While the lexicon
suggests aspirations for “We the People,”48 a cursory evaluation of “the
people” underscores how narrow the eighteenth-century definition was—
and was intended to be. Our modern, post-Fourteenth Amendment society
drastically alters this landscape.
The Second Amendment, seen modernly as an individual protection of
some variation, stood silent for decades while millions of Americans were
purposefully disarmed and or otherwise restricted from carrying
weapons.49 To recast the Second Amendment as a broad and inclusive
right for all requires cognitive dissidence between our disarming past and
our amnestic present.50 Or, to suggest this right is without limitation turns
a blind eye to history.51 Justice Scalia acknowledges this past in the Heller
case, noting:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the
19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely
explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19thcentury courts to consider the question held that prohibitions
on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the
have been not merely ‘of the white people’ and ‘by the white people’ but also, at least to an extent, ‘for
the white people.’”).
47
See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 39, at 326–27 (noting that the colonial laws “reflected the
desire to maintain white [male] supremacy and control”).
48
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
49
This author believes that there is, undoubtedly, an individual right component to the Second
Amendment. However, history suggests that the nature of that right was exclusive and generally
conditioned on being of a particular race, gender, and station in life. Thus, to suggest as the Supreme
Court does in Heller that “the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all
Americans,” 554 U.S. at 581, seems both fatally over- and under-inclusive.
50
See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century:
Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 7–8 (1989) (stating that the old common
law of England, which was adopted in large part by the American Colonies, contained no absolute right
to have arms). Ehrman and Henigan observed:
A central thesis of opponents of strong firearms regulations is that the old common
law of England supports a fundamental, personal right to be armed. There is no
dispute that the common law of England was in large part adopted by the American
colonies, or that it was at least highly influential . . . . It is highly doubtful, however,
that an absolute right to have arms was one of those rights or liberties. The
predominant, and better view, is that there was no such common law right.
Id.
51
This holds true even within the narrower militia-based context of the Second Amendment. The
term “white,” used to circumscribe the “able-bodied male citizens” federally compelled to enter militia
service, was not removed from the federal militia law until 1862—a full seventy years after the
ratification of the Second Amendment. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 1, 12 Stat. 597, 597.
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52

Second Amendment or state analogues.

The right to keep and bear arms has always been burdened by
regulations, although the types of limitations have changed over time.
Thus, we must make peace with our embarrassing, ironic, radical, and
limited Second Amendment.53 Or we could simply advance our rights as
Americans to lawfully own and use firearms in a thoroughly modern
Article V exercise.
Historically, only five Supreme Court opinions have directly evaluated
the Second Amendment.54 Only in the most recent two, Heller and
McDonald, does one encounter a surprisingly contemporary approach to
constitutional interpretation.55 For the first time in our constitutional
history the Second Amendment provides an individual right to arms that is
unconnected to militia service and disconnected from militia weaponry.56
One of the last provisions of the Bill of Rights to be deemed incorporated,
52

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
54
Prior to the Supreme Court’s two recent opinions, the Court had “handed down only three
direct opinions on the Second Amendment, the last one coming in 1939.” Higginbotham, supra note
45, at 263. The three cases preceding Heller and McDonald are United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
55
The Georgia Supreme Court explained the classic Second Amendment interpretation—which
remained the governing approach until 2008—as follows:
53

Were this question [of what is meant by the right to “keep and bear arms”] entirely a
new one, I should not myself hesitate to hold that the language of the constitution of
this state, as well as that of the United States, guarantees only the right to keep and
bear the “arms” necessary for a militiaman. It is to secure the existence of a well
regulated militia; that, by the express words of the clause, was the object of it, and I
have always been at a loss to follow the line of thought that extends the guarantee to
the right to carry pistols, dirks, Bowie-knives, and those other weapons of like
character, which, as all admit, are the greatest nuisances of our day. It is in my
judgment a perversion of the meaning of the word arms, as used in the phrase “the
right to keep and bear arms,” to treat it as including weapons of this character. The
preamble to the clause is the key to the meaning of it. The word “arms,” evidently
means the arms of a militiaman, the weapons ordinarily used in battle, to-wit: guns
of every kind, swords, bayonets, horseman’s pistols, etc. The very words, “bear
arms,” had then and now have, a technical meaning. The “arms bearing” part of a
people, were its men fit for service on the field of battle. That country was “armed”
that had an army ready for fight. The call “to arms,” was a call to put on the
habiliments of battle, and I greatly doubt if in any good author of those days, a use
of the word arms when applied to a people, can be found, which includes pocketpistols, dirks, sword-canes, toothpicks, Bowie-knives, and a host of other relics of
past barbarism, or inventions of modern savagery of like character. In what manner
the right to keep and bear these pests of society, can encourage or secure the
existence of a militia, and especially of a well regulated militia, I am not able to
devine.
Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474–75 (1874); see also United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir.
1977) (noting the individual rights model “has long been rejected”).
56
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
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the Second Amendment, was first found to apply to the individual states
after nearly two hundred years of jurisprudence holding to the contrary,
purportedly by the originalist wing of the Court.57 This thoroughly modern
interpretation, based on the “individual rights” paradigm, is explained by
Justice Scalia as follows:
It should be unsurprising that such a significant matter has
been for so long judicially unresolved. For most of our
history, the Bill of Rights was not thought applicable to the
States, and the Federal Government did not significantly
regulate the possession of firearms by law-abiding citizens.
Other provisions of the Bill of Rights have similarly
remained unilluminated for lengthy periods. This Court first
held a law to violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of speech in 1931, almost 150 years after the
Amendment was ratified, and it was not until after World
War II that we held a law invalid under the Establishment
Clause. Even a question as basic as the scope of proscribable
libel was not addressed by this Court until 1964, nearly two
centuries after the founding. It is demonstrably not true that,
as Justice Stevens claims, “for most of our history, the
invalidity of Second-Amendment-based objections to
firearms regulations has been well settled and
uncontroversial.” For most of our history the question did
not present itself.58
Our revolutionary Founders would find the individual rights model
quite foreign, if not offensive.59 It bears noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment and the incorporation of most portions of the Bill of Rights
against the states was not the design of the Founders. But for the
ratification of Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Amendment would only
be a protection against the federal government—leaving many of the
modern claims challenging excessive state regulation without any form of
redress or recognition. Gun regulation, in some form, existed in each of
the individual states when the Second Amendment was ratified.60
Further, the Founders were anything but populist when it came to
weapons and the notions of who might be trusted with arms. In this
57

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 625–26 (citations omitted).
59
See Higginbotham, supra note 45, at 267 (pointing out the possibility that “the Framers were
most interested in citizens, possessing military style weapons, limited to military purposes, for
employment only during their militia service”).
60
See Churchill, supra note 22, at 143 (“Hundreds of individual statutes regulated the possession
and use of guns in colonial and early national America.”); see also id. at 161–65 (describing gun
regulations in early America).
58

1478

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1463

manner, the Founders perpetuated our English heritage of discriminating
between who could be trusted with weapons and who could not.61
Blacks—both free and slave—Indians, non-Loyalists, Catholics, and other
groups were selectively excluded from legal access to weaponry.62 Today,
we continue to disarm those that society deems untrustworthy, such as
felons,63 domestic abusers,64 minors,65 and individuals with severe mental
illness.66 Disarmament is part of our country, our history, and our heritage
relating to guns, but regulations should not, in any manner, be disarming
those that are trustworthy and capable of lawfully owning guns.
Today, some two centuries beyond the Second Amendment, we find
ourselves at the juncture of another modern revolution. The modern
revolution is not one seeking freedom or democracy. The issues are not
slavery, savages, or standing armies.67 Rather, the modern revolution is
how to deal with an armed populace seemingly detached from the original

61
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller, provided the English ancestry of the Second
Amendment as follows:

Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, the Stuart Kings Charles II
and James II succeeded in using select militias loyal to them to suppress political
dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents. Under the auspices of the 1671
Game Act, for example, the Catholic Charles II had ordered general disarmaments
of regions home to his Protestant enemies. These experiences caused Englishmen to
be extremely wary of concentrated military forces run by the state and to be jealous
of their arms. They accordingly obtained an assurance from William and Mary, in
the Declaration of Right (which was codified as the English Bill of Rights), that
Protestants would never be disarmed: “That the Subjects which are Protestants may
have Arms for their Defense suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law.”
This right has long been understood to be the predecessor to our Second
Amendment.
554 U.S. at 592–93 (citations omitted). Thus, disarmament is, at its core, a significant component of
our firearms-related heritage.
62
See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
63
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
64
Id. § 922(g)(8).
65
Id. § 922(x)(2). For an early example of a court upholding bans on the arming of minors, see
State v. Callicutt, 69 Tenn. 714, 716–17 (1878).
66
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (“Although we do not undertake an
exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the
mentally ill . . . .”).
67
See Merkel, supra note 35, at 682–83 (underscoring the paradox between the colonial reticence
of standing armies and our modern affinity for the world’s most impressive military force). Professor
Merkel argues that today, “[w]e have grown to like military contractors and overseas military
adventures and to live with high taxes and huge deficits. We want military bases in our neighborhoods.
We fight to keep them from closing just as New Englanders of 1775 fought to shut them down.” Id. at
683.
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meaning of the Second Amendment.
How are we to analyze laws
restricting guns and munitions or calling for universal background checks?
How can we constitutionally confront mass shootings and the tragic
legacies of Tucson, Aurora, and Newtown while zealously protecting the
rights of lawful gun owners, including the right to concealed carry? Do
“stand your ground” laws truly have grounding in the Second
Amendment’s militia focus? And, even though “open carry” laws were not
tolerated for much of our history, they are a staple in many states today,
including the author’s home state of Texas. Open carry laws, regardless of
historical views, should not be made dependent on national tolerance or the
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation, but rather, should remain firmly
protected in the local democracy of state legislators.
Questions regarding the breadth of Second Amendment rights have
been partially answered, but the answers are still subject to fierce debate
and continuing interpretation. The current solution feels vulnerable, even
fleeting.69 Perhaps a better solution to these issues lies in the text of the
original Constitution rather than the incomprehensible meaning of the
Second Amendment’s twenty-seven words.70 Can Article V provide the
solace needed for both sides of the modern debate?71
This author’s solution to the Second Amendment conundrum is simple,
yet perhaps feels uncomfortable. History has not resolved the issue;
scholars have not resolved the issue.72 And, with a closely divided
68
See Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 161, 166
(2004) (“The right protected by the Second Amendment was one enjoyed by citizens who used their
privately owned weapons in a well-regulated militia.”).
69
Heller was a narrow 5–4 decision. Heller, 554 U.S. at 572. And McDonald was even more
fragmented with a 4–1–4 plurality opinion. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026
(2010).
70
See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 103, 111 (2000) (“Our quest to discover a perfect syntax and vocabulary for [these] twentyseven words thus risks ascribing to a general statement of principle a measure of legal exactitude it was
never conceived to carry.”).
71
Cf. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 137 (1943) (“The constitutional fathers, fresh
from a revolution, did not forge a political strait-jacket for the generations to come. Instead they wrote
Article V . . . . Article V contains procedural provisions for constitutional change by amendment
without any present limitation whatsoever except that no State may be deprived of equal representation
in the Senate without its consent.”).
72
E.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3121 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote:

The Court based its conclusions almost exclusively upon its reading of history. But
the relevant history in Heller was far from clear: Four dissenting Justices disagreed
with the majority’s historical analysis. And subsequent scholarly writing reveals
why disputed history provides treacherous ground on which to build decisions
written by judges who are not expert at history. Since Heller, historians, scholars,
and judges have continued to express the view that the Court’s historical account
was flawed.
Id.
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Supreme Court, any resolution that may appear secure now is tenuous at
best. Should lawful gun owners leave their rights to the chance
interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court? The recent 5–4 and plurality
decisions regarding the Second Amendment illustrate how evanescent
current case law may be. The change of a single Justice could overturn the
entire doctrine.
While many Americans resist changing our Constitution, being
understandably proud of its enduring nature, the Founders envisioned
precisely this quandary and provided us a protective tool in Article V.73
Perhaps the time has come to use the Founders’ tool to protect against
Judicial overreach. Perhaps the time has come to amend the Second
Amendment with a states’ rights model that returns power to the state
legislatures rather than the federal government. Our constitutional
paradigm places the ultimate authority for interpreting constitutional
questions with the Supreme Court. A thoughtful amendment to the Second
Amendment that returns the power of regulating lawful gun owners to our
state legislators could offer the best compromise between those seeking
regulation and those wanting full protection to lawfully own and use guns.
The solution may sound revolutionary. But, in fact, the tool being
suggested is one the Founders provided and one that others recognizing the
potential for judicial overreach in our broken federal system are also
embracing.
III. THE TOOLS OF THE LAWYER
[Originalism’s] greatest defect, in my view, is the difficulty
of applying it correctly. . . . [W]hat is true is that it is often
exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of
an ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the
consideration of an enormous mass of material—in the case
of the Constitution and its Amendments, for example, to
mention only one element, the records of the ratifying
debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it requires an
evaluation of the reliability of the material—many of the
73

Article V reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid as to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by the Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by Congress . . . .

U.S. CONST. art. V.
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reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are thought to
be quite unreliable. And further still, it requires immersing
oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the
time—somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have
which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes,
philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of
our day. It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the
historian than the lawyer.74
When the Supreme Court decided United States v. Heller, it did so
using the tools of the lawyer, rather than the historian. The Supreme Court
utilized this approach despite Justice Scalia’s own admonishment that
when seeking to interpret the original meaning of our Constitution’s
amendments, the task is “sometimes better suited to the historian than the
lawyer.”75 This author is conflicted, recognizing that history has a
chameleon-like quality, often changing to suit the needs of a particular
time or a particular situation.76 But, a Constitution should not be so elastic.
When it becomes so—varying in interpretation depending on the viewpoint
of the interpreter—perhaps the time has come to change its meaning
through amendment rather than historical interpretation or judicial caprice.
Before embarking on such a rarely traveled path, however, perhaps we
should heed the words of Justice Scalia and review the works of the
historians and lawyers.
A. Competing Historical Models
Current Second Amendment scholarship can be divided into two
distinct camps: the self-proclaimed “standard model,”77 which embraces an
individual right to keep and bear arms,78 and the more traditional
74

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856–57 (1989).
Id. at 857.
76
Cf. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 613–15 (2008)
(noting that the further society moves “from the time of adoption, the more likely it is that assertions
about then-contemporary public meaning will not track the public meaning at the time of adoption”).
77
See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461,
466 (1995) (defining the Second Amendment as rooted in “an individual right to keep and bear arms”).
Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds, a constitutional law scholar, coined the phrase “standard model,”
explaining that “there is sufficient consensus on many [Second Amendment] issues that one can
properly speak of a ‘Standard Model’ in Second Amendment theory, much as physicists and
cosmologists speak of a ‘Standard Model’ in terms of the creation and evolution of the Universe.” Id.
at 463. However, historians, like Professor Jack N. Rakove, express some indignation toward those
“march[ing] under the banner of the self-proclaimed ‘standard model.’” Rakove, supra note 70, at 103.
78
See, e.g., Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History: District of
Columbia v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2009) (remarking that “[f]or most of its history the
Second Amendment was understood to confer an individual right”). Notably, the author did not
support this statement with a citation. For articles written by other standard model scholars, see
Clayton E. Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson & George A. Mocsary, “This Right Is Not Allowed by
75
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“collective rights” model, which is urged more by historians than
lawyers.79 However, these two approaches are not, and should not be, the
only options in evaluating the Second Amendment.80 Historians continue
their assault against the standard model, protesting that its scholars at times
demonstrate a selective81 approach toward history.82 The standard model
may be more aptly called the “twenty-first-century model,” as a thorough
review of case law, statutory evolution, and nineteenth-83 and early
twentieth-century scholarship84 suggests the standard model is, in some

Governments that Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning of the Second Amendment When the
Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823 (2010); Stephen P. Halbrook, What
the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms,” 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 151 (1986); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 144–45 (1986); David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the
Twentieth Century—and Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527 (2012);
Reynolds, supra note 77; and Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 793 (1998).
79
Merkel, supra note 35, at 676. Professor Merkel notes that he and others have urged a more
centrist position, “acknowledging that the right to arms was intended to attach to individuals, but
stressing that it was also understood to serve overwhelmingly public purposes rather than private ones
such as personal self-defense or the needs of hunters.” Id.
80
Id.; see also Amar, supra note 33, at 103 (arguing that both individual rights and states’ rights
proponents are wrong in their interpretation of the Second Amendment); Cornell, supra note 68, at 161
(suggesting that neither the individual rights view nor the collective rights view is the appropriate
paradigm to think about the Second Amendment).
81
One such “selective” example is Professor Malcolm’s unsupported statement that “American
society trusted the good sense of ordinary citizens in permitting them to be armed.” Malcolm, supra
note 78, at 1381. This statement does not contain any citation so it is difficult to appreciate what is
being referenced. As her article demonstrates, the Founders aggressively sought to disarm—out of
distrust—Native Americans and African-Americans, both free and slave. See id. (describing the
growing distrust emerging in the early twentieth century that led to discriminatory state laws limiting
some individual’s gun rights). Further, her article confirms that nearly every state has had laws that
keep weapons out of the hands of those deemed untrustworthy or those weapons deemed more
dangerous than sensible. See id. at 1381–82 (providing examples of state and municipal laws which
restrict ownership of firearms).
82
See Merkel, supra note 35, at 685 (chastising the legal academy’s deficient history by stating
that “much of the history that supplies the allegedly empirical basis for Second Amendment theorizing
cannot be taken seriously on its own terms, and would be censured in any vigorous undergraduate
program even in an educational milieu otherwise committed to positive reinforcement”).
83
See John F. Dillon, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defense, 1 CENT.
L.J. 259, 259–61 (1874) (providing examples of cases involving the right to bear arms from the
nineteenth century).
84
See Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV.
473, 476–77 (1915) (urging that the Second Amendment “should be construed in connection with the
well-known objection to standing armies and the general belief in the need and sufficiency of a wellregulated militia for the defense of the people and the state” rather than an individual rights model);
George I. Haight, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 2 BILL RTS. REV. 31, 31 (1941) (“The right . . .
must be read in keeping with the context which indicates the purpose of the right, namely: to secure the
maintenance of a well-regulated militia.”); Daniel J. McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 12
MARQ. L. REV. 138, 143 (1928) (“Judging from the prevailing trend of the cases, it would seem as if

2014]

A RETURN TO THE STATES’ RIGHTS MODEL

1483

85

measure, ahistorical.
In determining the breadth of the Second
Amendment, “[n]o coherent intention or understanding of the existence
and scope of a private, individual right to keep and bear arms could [have
been historically] derived, because that question did not present itself for
public debate in the form in which we now know it.”86 The aim of the
Second Amendment, pure and simple, was the ability to retain militias as a
guard against tyranny.87 As one scholar exclaims, “The Framers
envisioned Minutemen bearing guns, not Daniel Boone gunning bears.”88
The twenty-first-century prism of individual rights used by the
standard model scholars does not adequately appreciate the limited nature
of individual rights during the colonial period; nor does it accurately
portray custom and legislation that governed a society fearful of standing
armies and lacked a professional police force.89 We are ill-equipped to
appreciate the colonists’ dedication to militias preserved in the Second
Amendment. The vernacular of “hue and cry,” “musket,” and “firelock” is
as foreign to us as the notion of “substantive due process” and
“incorporation” would be to our Founders. Claims that the Second
Amendment permitted everyone to own weaponry would be an affront to
eighteenth-century mores. The Founders would likely challenge the notion
that the government could not register weaponry or prohibit gun
ownership.90 Unlike modern Americans, the founding generation endured
mandatory gun registration as a basis for ensuring a functional militia, and
routinely disarmed those considered threatening to the established social
order.91 Individual rights, as such, were far more limited in colonial
America than those that exist now. Post-Fourteenth Amendment, our
society is one that embraces individualism and personal liberties—from
gun ownership to claims of reproductive freedom. Such a constitutional
the Second Amendment only forbids Congress so to disarm citizens as to prevent them from
functioning as state militia men.”).
85
See Cornell, supra note 68, at 161 (challenging that “[w]hile this neat dichotomy furthers the
interests of those involved in modern political debates about gun policy, it is not particularly useful for
understanding the eighteenth-century world in which the Second Amendment was drafted and
adopted”); see also Rakove, supra note 70, at 111–12 (suggesting that the Founders only considered
the militia—and not individual rights—in their public debates when enacting the Second Amendment).
86
Rakove, supra note 70, at 112.
87
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008).
88
Amar, supra note 33, at 106.
89
Id.; see also Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 34–35 (explaining that the militias “gave the
states a source of internal police power”); Lund, supra note 41, at 7 (describing how the Crown, like
the Colonies, “lacked the financial resources to maintain a permanent army or police force”).
90
Adam
Winkler,
The
Secret
History
of
Guns,
THE
ATLANTIC
(July 24, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-ofguns/308608/?single_page=true.
91
Id.; see also Rakove, supra note 70, at 110 (“The American colonies and states were not a
libertarian utopia; their traditions of governance permitted legislatures and institutions of local
government to act vigorously in the pursuit of public health and safety.”).

1484

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1463

paradigm would have been quite unthinkable in the colonial era.
Our Founders feared, above most other issues, two things: (1) a
standing army, having lived through King George’s quartering of soldiers
in colonial homes; and (2) governmental tyranny.92 These fears were
classically English and date back to the ouster of James II during the
Glorious Revolution. While the standard model scholars speak of the
English Bill of Rights as if it were comparable to our Bill of Rights, a
contextual review of the ascension of William and Mary to the English
throne demonstrates, quite clearly, that the motivations behind the socalled English Bill of Rights were the same grievances that our Founders
placed in the Declaration of Independence: governmental tyranny,
contempt for standing armies, and disdain for the quartering of soldiers in
citizens’ homes.93 The disarmament issue was intimately tied to these
primary issues with militias proffering the first line of collective,
communal defense.94 Militias were a critical part of early America.95
Today, modern Americans embrace our impressive military without a fear
that soldiers will be forced to take refuge in our homes. Further, we rely
on our soldiers to keep us safe from all threats to our security and liberty
and regularly celebrate the standing military that is part of the fabric of this
great nation.
Through this eighteenth-century lens—one where the Bill of Rights
was intended to limit the federal government from encroaching on states’
rights—scholars should appreciate the limited approach to colonial-era
“rights.”96 Rights in 1787 and 1791 were vastly cabined in contrast to
rights as we speak of them today.97 To modernize, or revise, history by
urging the contemporary viewpoint of a post-Fourteenth Amendment Bill
of Rights as securing “my individual rights,” is to alter both the colonial
viewpoint and experience.98 It is an attempt to modernize their eighteenth92
Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical
Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 205 (2000) (“According to the traditional Whig and
Republican ideology of this period, a standing army threatened the liberties of a free people. This
argument was rooted in English history . . . .”).
93
Finkelman, supra note 92, at 205–06; see also Roy Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed
Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 977–79
(1975).
94
See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 226 (observing that any “right” to own weapons, as such, was
collective in nature, always being related to an individual’s service in a “well regulated militia”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
95
Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 6 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 263
(2000).
96
Finkelman, supra note 92, at 233.
97
See Higginbotham, supra note 45, at 267 (“Given deep-seated beliefs about the corporate
nature of society and mercantile practices, provincial lawmakers would have considered nineteenthcentury liberalism or laissez-faire notions unthinkable.”).
98
See Cornell, supra note 68, at 164 (discussing an “alternative Second Amendment universe” to
criticize the historical approach of the “standard model” scholars).
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century Constitution to fit our twenty-first-century needs in an attempt to
conform to the post-Fourteenth Amendment living Constitution.
B. Regulations vs. Rights
Traditionally, the “right” to keep and bear arms was more properly
considered a duty for able-bodied white males to be prepared to defend
one’s community in cases of aggression or insurrection.99 The twentyfirst-century individualistic paradigm and vernacular of “my rights” did not
exist in either English or early American history.100 An “individual right,”
to the extent such right existed, was recognized in colonial America more
in the civic, communal sense and was generally tied to militia service.101
State police power, in its most literal application, easily trumped individual
rights.102 Colonists and early nineteenth-century Americans appreciated
that weapons were to be regulated, often registered, limited, or wholly
prohibited.103 They also appreciated that a large segment of the
population—women, Indians, slaves, free blacks, and resident aliens—
would have been openly denied this so-called “right.”104 Nearly all
states—either constitutionally or legislatively—retained the right to
regulate weaponry, to determine which individuals were qualified to keep
or bear arms, and to completely proscribe concealed weapons through the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.105
Gun regulations and proscriptions were commonplace in the nineteenth

99
See Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right
to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 572
(2006) (describing the colonial militia experience as a civic versus an individual right).
100
Cornell, supra note 68, at 164–65.
101
Id. Cornell explains that such a civic right “was inextricably linked to the obligation to
participate in communal defense as part of a well-regulated militia.” Id. at 165. Further, while
“[w]omen, free Africans, and resident aliens might claim a genuinely individual right such as the right
of religious conscience . . . they were not included among those who bore arms.” Id.
102
See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 70, at 127 (explaining that the Framers rejected their opportunity
to curb police power and state authority in regard to the individual’s right to bear arms). “Neither at
Philadelphia nor New York would it have occurred to anyone to ask whether adoption or amendment of
the Constitution would diminish the capacity of state and local governments, in the exercise of their
conventional police powers, to impose legislative restrictions on the use or ownership of firearms.” Id.
103
See Churchill, supra note 22, 161 (observing that colonial laws “required militiamen and other
householders to bring their guns to the muster field twice a year so that militia officers could record
which men in the community owned guns” and that “[s]ome colonies authorized door-to-door surveys
of gun ownership”).
104
Cornell, supra note 68, at 165.
105
Rakove, supra note 70, at 110. Professor Rakove notes that “our reading of the Second
Amendment is conditioned by the results of an era (or several eras) of modern rights-oriented
jurisprudence which naturally assumes that bills of rights exist to create legally enforceable immunities
against the coercive power of the state.” Id.
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and early twentieth centuries.
The Second Amendment imposed no
impediment. Historian Saul Cornell credits Kentucky as being the first
American state to curb the carrying of concealed weapons.107 Violations
carried a fine of up to $100, a substantial sum in 1813.108 That same year,
Louisiana passed a similar statute that made it a capital offense to kill or
disable another person using a concealed weapon.109 Indiana and other
states soon followed suit, including prohibitions passed in Georgia,
Virginia, Alabama, and Ohio between the years 1820 and 1859.110
In 1872, the Supreme Court of Texas used very strong language to find
the Second Amendment inapplicable to its deadly weapon statute:
To refer the deadly devices and instruments called in the
statute “deadly weapons,” to the proper or necessary arms of
a “well-regulated militia,” is simply ridiculous. No kind of
travesty, however subtle or ingenious, could so misconstrue
this provision of the constitution of the United States, as to
make it cover and protect that pernicious vice, from which so
many murders, assassinations, and deadly assaults have
sprung, and which it was doubtless the intention of the
legislature to punish and prohibit. The word “arms” in the
connection we find it in the constitution of the United States,
refers to the arms of a militiaman or solider, and the word is
used in its military sense.111
The prevailing sentiment among courts and state legislatures was that
this militia-based approach was settled law.112 Concealed weapons laws,
proscriptions against possessing a concealed weapon in the home, and
other regulations passed under traditional police powers were regularly
enforced; this was true in Arkansas,113 Indiana,114 Georgia,115 Ohio,116
106
See, e.g., United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942) (noting that “[w]eapon
bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute right by the common law,” and describing
various state and federal regulations pertaining to dangerous weaponry), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
107
Cornell, supra note 99, at 584. As Cornell describes, Kentucky “forbade anyone but travelers
from carrying ‘[a] pocket pistol, dirk, large knife, or sword in a cane, concealed as a weapon.’” Id.
(quoting Acts Passed at the First Session of the Twenty First General Assembly for the Commonwealth
of Kentucky 100–11 (1813)).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 585.
111
English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 477 (1872).
112
See, e.g., United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing cases which
“have analyzed the second amendment purely in terms of protecting state militias, rather than
individual rights”).
113
See Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 461 (1876) (approving a concealed weapon law after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment); Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99, 101 (1872) (“[A] constitutional
right to bear arms in defense of person and property does not prohibit the legislature from making such
police regulations as may be necessary for the good of society, as to the manner in which such arms
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Kansas,
Oklahoma,
Delaware,
Missouri,
Tennessee,
North
Carolina,122 Pennsylvania,123 Alabama,124 Texas,125 and Massachusetts,126
among others.
Unsuccessful court challenges to gun regulations helped cement the
notion that the Second Amendment did not apply to the individual states.127
Courts universally found that state and federal gun restrictions were
shall be borne. Neither natural nor constitutional right authorizes a citizen to use his own property or
bear his own arms in such a way as to injure the property or endanger the life of his fellow
citizen . . . .”); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 18, 28 (1842) (finding that the defendant should have been
indicted for violating the state concealed carry law).
114
State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229, 229 (Ind. 1833).
115
See Strickland v. State, 72 S.E. 260, 260, 269 (Ga. 1911) (upholding an act proscribing the
carrying of a pistol or revolver post-Fourteenth Amendment ratification); Brown v. State, 39 S.E. 873,
873–74 (Ga. 1901) (upholding a concealed weapons law even against a person maintaining a concealed
weapon in the privacy of his own home).
116
See State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 663, 665 (Ohio 1920) (overturning a “[n]ot guilty” verdict
where a weapon proscription was applied in the home).
117
See City of Salinas v. Blaskey, 83 P. 619, 621 (Kan. 1905) (“The right to keep and bear arms
for the common defense does not include the right to associate together as a military organization, or to
drill and parade with arms in cities or towns, unless authorized to do so by law.”).
118
See Ex parte Thomas, 97 P. 260, 262 (Okla. 1908) (“Practically all of the states under
constitutional provisions similar to ours have held that acts of the Legislatures against the carrying of
weapons concealed did not conflict with such constitutional provision denying infringement of the right
to bear arms, but were a valid exercise of the police power of the state.”).
119
See State v. Quail, 92 A. 859, 859 (Del. 1914) (finding an individual guilty of carrying a
concealed weapon even though the revolver was unloaded).
120
See State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 528–29 (1881) (“The law prohibiting the wearing of
concealed weapons, is a police regulation for the protection of society and not an infringement of the
constitutional right to bear arms. It does not prohibit the right to bear arms, but provides that they shall
not be worn in a manner dangerous to the welfare of society.”); see also State v. Shelby, 2 S.W. 468,
469 (Mo. 1886) (“The right of the legislature to prohibit the wearing of concealed weapons, under state
constitutions in many respects like our own, is now generally conceded.”).
121
See State v. Burgoyne, 75 Tenn. 173, 174, 179 (1881) (sustaining a conviction for the sale of
pistols post-Fourteenth Amendment ratification); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 159 (1840)
(finding only militia weapons to be free from state regulation).
122
See State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 697, 700–01 (1882) (sustaining a conviction for carrying a
concealed weapon, even though the purpose of carrying the weapon was self-protection).
123
See McMillen v. Steele, 119 A. 721, 722 (Pa. 1923) (discussing the prohibition of sale of guns
to minors).
124
See State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 621–22 (1840) (upholding a law banning concealed weapons
because only weapons that were carried openly served the purpose of defending a person and the state).
125
See English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478–79 (1872) (discussing the legislature’s right to regulate
the privilege granted by the Second Amendment).
126
See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E. 138, 138 (Mass. 1896) (upholding a law prohibiting
the non-militia-affiliated marching and drilling with firearms post-Fourteenth Amendment ratification).
127
See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (“The right to keep and
bear arms is not a right conferred upon the people by the federal constitution. Whatever rights in this
respect the people may have depend upon local legislation; the only function of the Second
Amendment being to prevent the federal government and the federal government only from infringing
that right.”); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the Second Amendment does not apply to the states).
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As the Third Circuit noted in 1942:

Weapon bearing was never treated as anything like an
absolute right by the common law. It was regulated by
statute as to time and place as far back as the Statute of
Northampton in 1328 and on many occasions since. The
decisions under the State Constitutions show the upholding
of regulations prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons,
prohibiting persons from going armed in certain public places
and other restrictions, in the nature of police
regulations . . . .129
These regulations were routinely upheld despite the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.130 Whatever its protection against federal
encroachment, until 2010, the Second Amendment was impotent against
challenges to state regulations.131
History changed dramatically in 2008 and 2010 when the Supreme
Court provided a decidedly modern interpretation to the Second
Amendment.132 Gone is any reliance on the Statute of Northampton, a
fourteenth-century law prohibiting English citizens from going or riding
“armed by night or by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of
Justices or other Ministers.”133 We are no longer damned to retain the
legacy of an English Bill of Rights that disarmed the Catholics, who had
first disarmed the Protestants, noting that “the subjects which are
Protestants, may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions

128
See United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266–67 (3d Cir. 1942) (“[T]his amendment, unlike
those providing for protection of free speech and freedom of religion, was not adopted with individual
rights in mind, but as a protection for the States in the maintenance of their militia organizations against
possible encroachments by the federal power.”), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The most notable
exception, Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90 (Ky. 1822), was considered by nearly every state court to
be a remarkable outlier. See, e.g., State v. Keet, 190 S.W. 573, 574–75 (Mo. 1916) (“[Bliss] has never
been cited with approval, but has often been disapproved.”); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154,
160 (1840) (“We are aware that the court of appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Bliss v.
Commonwealth . . . [decided that legislation which prohibited concealed weapons] is unconstitutional
and void. We have great respect for the court by whom that decision was made, but we cannot concur
in their reasoning.”).
129
Tot, 131 F.2d at 266.
130
See, e.g., Quilici, 695 F.2d at 269–70 (holding that the right to keep and bear arms is so limited
by a state’s police power that a ban on handguns did not violate the right).
131
See, e.g., id. (holding that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states and the state is
free to regulate gun laws using its police power).
132
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the right to keep and bear arms is applicable to the states by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
133
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 8.
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and as allowed by law.” We are now free to recognize that the historical
model, built on muskets and militias, is unworkable and can transition to a
Constitution that promises individual protections and freedoms through a
vibrant, nearly fully incorporated Fourteenth Amendment. The time is ripe
for us to break free from an uncertain history that has proven ill-equipped
to meet the needs of its twenty-first-century citizens keeping and bearing
twenty-first-century weaponry.
Article V, which outlines the constitutional amendment process,
permits us to modernize our constitutional approach toward weaponry
without doing injustice to our history.135 We can accept the truth that what
was relevant for colonial America is no longer relevant for us today,
particularly after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not
rely on militias. We do not own muskets or slaves. Women have secured
the right to work and vote. Individual rights and freedoms “emanate” from
the “penumbras” of our brilliant Constitution,136 though those emanations
continue to be first articulated by our Supreme Court. This ability to
“expound” individual rights is not found directly in any portion of our
Constitution but continues to find its source in judicial review, with rights
being enlarged or constricted often based upon the composition of the
Supreme Court and its view of history.137 Our modern world is struggling
with the Second Amendment, but not because we do not understand what it
134
Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 43 (1971)); see also id. (“[T]here is little historical support for the idea that
the English Bill of Rights was attempting to ensure some absolute right of individuals to have arms.
Instead, the focus of this section of the Bill of Rights was a conflict between Protestants and Catholics
over respective roles in the militia and the army.”).
135
See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 137 n.15 (1943) (“Writing in 1816 Jefferson
said: ‘Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the
covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than
human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and
labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience
of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of bookreading; and this
they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent
and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with;
because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting
their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of
the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made,
new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions
must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat
which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous
ancestors.’” (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 37, 42–43 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899))).
136
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (writing that “specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance). Griswold opened the door to a new era of “individual rights” that continues to
grow, even to this day. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
137
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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meant.
Rather, we are struggling because we do not know,
constitutionally-speaking, how to properly modernize its application. This
author would urge that we forego the continuing historical debates, accept
the Second Amendment’s fallibilities, and create a more workable solution
using Article V’s proffered tool. The time has come to take control of our
destiny to ensure continued gun ownership by lawful gun owning citizens.
Relying upon statutes from the fourteenth century as a basis for assessing
whether a twenty-first-century individual may own weaponry for his or her
defense seems absurd, particularly in light of the transformative impact the
Fourteenth Amendment has had, and continues to have, on our
Constitution. The Founders knew we would arrive at this juncture.138
They prepared a path in Article V—firmly entrenched within the words of
the Constitution.139 Article V gave us the Bill of Rights and the imperative
Fourteenth Amendment. Let us once again utilize Article V to create a
workable solution that is not beholden to the “standard model” or the
historians. Let us build on the presumption that law-abiding citizens have
a right to arms and a right to self-defense. Let us not allow this individual
right be subject to judicial reconsideration. Let us create an amendment
that serves the rights American citizens have fought long and hard to
secure, without fear of any changes in Supreme Court membership.
C. The Text of Any Amendment Must Protect the Right of Law-Abiding
Individuals to Own and Use Guns
It has been said that history repeats itself. So, as we prepare to move
forward and strengthen our Second Amendment, it is important to consider
how the Framers approached their task.140 Granted, there will be vital
distinctions between the path we select today and the paths that opened up
in the late 1700s. But, we can learn from the Founders that what we put
into our new amendment may be every bit as important as what we leave
out. A brief, textual analysis of the Second Amendment sheds important
light on how we should move ourselves forward.
Our Founders were acutely aware of the need to add a Bill of Rights to
constrain the federal government from the encroachments on individual

138
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 135 (“As [the human
mind] becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed,
and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also,
and keep pace with the times.”).
139
See Ralph R. Martig, Amending the Constitution, Article Five: The Keystone of the Arch, 35
MICH. L. REV. 1253, 1253–61 (1937) (discussing the history leading up to the drafting of Article V).
140
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 652 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The
proper allocation of military power in the new Nation was an issue of central concern for the Framers.
The compromises they ultimately reached, reflected in Article I’s Militia Clauses and the Second
Amendment, represent quintessential examples of the Framers’ ‘splitting the atom of sovereignty.’”).
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states.
The English experience foretold a need to curtail royal
prerogative and federal power. Thus, when the Founders gathered to begin
drafting our Bill of Rights, their primary goal was to limit federal power,
not engorge individual freedoms.142 The goal was to improve the Articles
of Confederation and its weak federal government while simultaneously
continuing a states’ rights approach that would permit the variances of
slavery and northern living.
The Founders were certainly schooled in state constitutional rights,
rights whose declarations regarding arms were often much more clearly
written and focused on the broader individual right to protect oneself and
community.143 The Founders knew the value of states’ rights. But, in the
federalism experiment, the Founders believed that perpetuating state
militias was the surest guard against standing armies.144 As Saul Cornell
notes, “America’s first great charter of liberty, the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, made no mention of the right to bear arms. It did, however, assert
the necessity of a well-regulated militia.”145 In fact, Thomas Jefferson
initially proposed a broad right to own and use weaponry that was rejected
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights in favor of George Mason’s militiabased protection.146 This militia focus embraced a distinctively colonial
value.147
In contrast to the Virginia approach, the Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights, described as an outlier by one scholar,148 protected quite explicitly

141
See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 197 (“The Federalists . . . offer[ed] a series of amendments
that, for the most part, recognized existing limitations on the national government under the new
Constitution.”).
142
See Rakove, supra note 70, at 161–62 (“The debate over a bill of rights . . . was about limiting
the powers of the proposed national government, not trenching further on the traditional police
responsibilities of the states.”).
143
See Amar, supra note 33, at 104 (“[S]tate constitutions in 1789 consistently used the phrase
‘bear arms’ in military contexts and no other.”).
144
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Second Amendment was adopted to
protect the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia. It was a
response to concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that the power of Congress to
disarm the state militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to the
sovereignty of the several States.”); see also id. at 651 (“When each word in the text is given full effect,
the Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in
conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia.”).
145
Cornell, supra note 99, at 573.
146
Id. at 574.
147
See id. at 572 (“Eighteenth-century ideas about the right to bear arms reflected the realities of
the colonial experience. The militia provided colonists with a means of protecting themselves from
external threats and served as a means of preserving public order against the danger of insurrection.”).
148
See id. at 578 (“The focus on the Pennsylvania Constitution by modern gun rights advocates
seems ironic given that the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was derided by many within the
Founding generation, a fact that led Pennsylvanians to cast it aside within a generation of adopting it.”).
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the “right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state.”149
Sometime thereafter, Massachusetts sought to protect a similar right in
securing the “right to keep and bear arms for the common defense.”150
But, as noted constitutional scholar Akil Amar reminds, modern observers
struggle with a clear understanding of eighteenth-century text because
“[w]hen we turn to state constitutions, we consistently find arms-bearing
and militia clauses intertwined with rules governing standing armies,
troop-quartering, martial law, and civilian supremacy.”151 Clearly, the
Founders world is not our world and our post-Fourteenth Amendment
Constitution is not their Constitution.
The Founders did not write on a clean slate, one unaffected by history
or governing laws. And neither will we. The Founders were certainly
aware of the English militia history beginning with the twelfth-century
Assize of Arms.152 They were raised on the notion that a militia, rather
than a standing army, provided the truest guard against the tyranny of the
State.153 The Founders would have appreciated the distinctions provided
by the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights, and the various existing state constitutions.154 The language chosen
was most assuredly purposeful, drawn from current experience and
existing documents. As one scholar notes, “Congress was certainly on
notice that demands for explicit protections of [individual] rights were on
the table and could easily have put such language” into the Second
Amendment.155 The choices made were informed and deliberate, but made
at a time when individual rights were not as highly valued for all citizens
as they are today.156 The distinct manner of drafting the right sought to be
protected existed in Pennsylvania and other states and would have been

149
Id. at 573. But, this same Constitution safeguarded the right to hunt in a separate provision
from the right to “bear arms,” which Cornell suggests merits further analysis regarding the individual
versus civic right protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution’s “right to bear arms.” Id. at 581.
150
Id. at 573.
151
Amar, supra note 33, at 106.
152
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 50, at 10.
153
See id. at 10–11 (detailing the various English struggles between Kings, Parliament, and
citizens involving tension between the standing armies and militia rule).
154
Finkelman, supra note 92, at 208–12, 231–32. The Pennsylvania minority approach is cited by
many of the “standard model” scholars as proof that the Second Amendment establishes an individual
right. While that may have been true within the borders of Pennsylvania, it was most assuredly an
approach that was actively rejected by the Founders in the ultimate drafting of the Second Amendment.
See id. at 231–32 (discussing the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 in comparison to the Second
Amendment).
155
Id. at 212.
156
See id. (“The fact that Madison and Congress did not propose amendments along the lines
demanded by the Pennsylvania minority leads to a prima facie conclusion that they did not intend to
incorporate such protections into the Bill of Rights.”).
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well known to those participating in the constitutional process.
Madison’s original phrasing presents the strongest possible claim for
an individual right—limited but at least more akin to our modern
understanding—to bear arms. This first draft read:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the
best security of a free country: but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render
military service in person.158
This initial presentation, however, did not survive long. The House
Committee responsible for reviewing the amendments made three
significant changes to Madison’s draft language.159 First, the Committee
moved the militia language ahead of the right to “keep and bear arms.”160
Second, the Committee removed the semicolon in the first sentence and,
instead, inserted a comma.161 Third, the House Committee further
elaborated what was meant by a well-regulated militia, referring to “the
body of the people.”162 It bears emphasizing that the eighteenth-century
understanding of “the people” never meant all the people in its literal
sense. In our pre-Fourteenth Amendment society, “the body of the people”
referred solely to portions of the white male population. 163
157
See id. at 209 (highlighting the comprehensive language used in the Antifederalists’ Reasons
of Dissent, which “underscore[ed] the connection many Antifederalists saw between state sovereignty
and the control of the state militia”).
158
Rakove, supra note 70, at 120 (quoting THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS,
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 169 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159
Id. at 121–22.
160
Id.
161
Id. While it is nearly impossible to appreciate what the House Committee intended by
removing the semicolon and replacing it with a comma, Professor Rakove presents the most probable
explanation of transposing the first two “rights” and then connecting these with a comma rather than
semicolon:

[I]f the semicolon in Madison’s original resolution could be read as stating two
distinct rights, not one, its replacement by a comma would seem to connect the two
members of the Amendment more closely; that is, it would link the preamble and the
right more intimately than had been the case before, and thereby tie the right of arms
bearing to the institution of the militia.
Id. at 126.
162
Id. at 122.
163
Id. at 108. Rakove provides a very critical observation regarding originalist constitutional
interpretation, namely, that the proper originalist approach toward the militia requires acceptance that:
[T]he concept of the militia had a fixed and consensually accepted meaning in
ordinary usage, so that it was essentially coterminous with the free adult male
population physically capable of bearing arms; and if the language of the
Constitution is not to be rendered completely plastic, modern interpretation has to
preserve that meaning.
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Thus, when the official Second Amendment text was proffered in the
House, it read as follows: “A well regulated militia, composed of the body
of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously
scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.”164
This original phrasing contains a clear emphasis on the duty, during
the eighteenth century, of “the body of the people” to supply the first line
of communal defense.165 The goal was to diffuse the Antifederalists fears
regarding the continuing viability of militias.166 At the same time,
Madison wanted to ensure that those harboring religious objections to
participating in militia duty would be protected against compelled service.
This improved version, however, would not survive in the Senate. Instead,
the Senate ultimately settled on the Amendment’s current language: “A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”167
“Perhaps no provision in the Constitution causes one to stumble quite
so much on a first reading, or second, or third reading, as the short
provision in the Second Amendment of the Bill of Rights.”168 What
remains clear, however—to the extent any clarity can be obtained from
eighteenth-century writings—is that the Founders were surely aware that
they had numerous options from which to choose when drafting the
Second Amendment.169 The Latin phrase, expressio unius est exclusion
alterius should be conceded in measuring the final version of our Second
Amendment.170 The Founders knew that certain existing state constitutions

Id.
164
Finkelman, supra note 92, at 226 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 749 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed.,
1834)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165
See Merkel, supra note 35, at 688 (“[The eighteenth-century] right to arms was thus not only
more civic than privatistic, it also happily existed alongside a wide array of regulations and restrictions
pertaining to arms possession and use.”).
166
See id. at 680–81 (“Many of the founders, and more of the Anti-Federalists, who agitated for a
Bill of Rights, preferred that the nation place its first reliance on local citizen militia rather than
professional soldiery.” (footnote omitted)).
167
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
168
William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J.
1236, 1236 (1994).
169
See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 207–12 (describing the content of the Antifederalist’s
“proposed amendments concerning the army, the militia, the right to bear arms, and the right to hunt,”
which were ultimately excluded from the Second Amendment). In particular, Professor Finkelman
notes that the Pennsylvania delegation, often highlighted by the “standard model” scholars, proposed
three amendments to the Constitution solely relating to gun ownership and military matters. Id. at 207.
Clearly included in these three “gun rights” proposals were amendments to secure “the right of selfprotection through the ownership of weapons . . . [and] the right to hunt and fish.” Id. Only those
proffered amendments speaking to the militia were ultimately enveloped in the Bill of Rights.
170
Chief Justice Marshall embraced this same concept in Marbury v. Madison when he reminded:
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contained clauses guaranteeing an individually focused right of selfdefense.171 The Founders knew that existing state constitutions tethered
the right to keep or bears arms to both individual and communal defense,
something uniquely experienced in eighteenth-century America, but
declined to embrace a broader individual rights model.172 This is not to
suggest that such individual right cannot be found, modernly, in the
Second Amendment. Such individual right – though currently limited to
permitting a handgun for the protection of one’s self in the home – has
indeed been found. This history is provided to underscore that our modern
“rights-based” Constitution is a vastly different Constitution from the one
ratified in 1788.
Textually, it is impossible to ignore the militia focus of the Second
Amendment.173 “The draft language suggests that the framers saw this
essentially as an amendment connected to the militia; any right to own
weapons was a collective right, derived from the right of each state to
maintain a ‘well regulated militia.’”174 As Akhil Amar observes:
[P]rotection against thugs and pirates was not the main image
of the Second Amendment at the Founding. The amendment
was about Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. When arms
were outlawed, only the king’s men would have arms. The
amendments forged in the afterglow of the Revolution
reflected obvious anxiety about a standing army controlled
by the new imperial government, and affection for the good

Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those
affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or
they have no operation at all. It cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is
inadmissible, unless the words require it.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
171
Professor Finkelman quotes two of the proposed Pennsylvania Amendments. Number Seven
called for broad gun ownership “for the defense of themselves and their own state . . . or for the
purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for
crimes committed,” and Number Eight sought to protect the “liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable
times.” Finkelman, supra note 92, at 208. Both recommendations were plainly discarded in the
drafting of the Second Amendment, which omits any clearly stated individual right to own a weapon or
protect the right to hunt or fowl.
172
See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 231 (“The fact that Madison refused to adopt such [individual
rights-based] language—and that Congress did not amend the proposal to add such language—suggests
that the Federalists who were in control of Congress in 1789 did not intend to create an individual
right.”).
173
See id. at 208 (“By seeing what the framers of the Second Amendment did not do, we can
better understand what they did do.”). In interpreting the Second Amendment, Professor Finkelman
advocates a very logical approach: “[I]t is useful to consider what Congress might have written, but did
not.” Id.
174
Id. at 226.
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175

old militia.

However, the “legal and social structure upon which the [Second
Amendment] is built no longer exists.”176 Whatever relevance the militia
may have held two centuries ago has vanished just as quickly as the
musket and flintlock. Modern Americans struggle to appreciate the
transposition of a standing army and militia as we depend upon, and
embrace, our modern military to an extent that would, and in fact did,
alarm the Founders.177 Our patriotism was their heresy.
Thus, we are faced with the dilemma of clinging to an Amendment that
evokes controversy without adequately protecting the individual rights
springing forth from our Constitution. The Founders’ Second Amendment
is vastly distinct from our Second Amendment. The eighteenth-century
militia is a historic relic. Such world-view has been extinguished by
massive standing armies, nuclear and chemical weaponry, and
technological advances that permit a soldier sitting in the United States or
elsewhere to send a drone thousands of miles away without ever herself
facing physical danger.178 While the fear of tyranny still exists, the fear of
a standing army—particularly our great military—does not.
We have become so removed in time and experience from the
Founding generation that it seems naïve to continue to rely upon their
defense model. We have professional police forces. We have an extensive
standing army, perhaps the greatest military in the world. We have laws
that permit individuals to stand their ground and carry concealed weapons.
We recognize a right of self-defense regardless of race, gender, or national
origin.179 In short, our world has radically transformed from the world
encountered by our Founders. Why, then, should our Second Amendment
as currently constructed continue to endure, weathering what will surely
become constitutional storm after storm? Why risk the rights of lawful gun
owners to own and use their weapons? Why not use the tools that were left
for us when facing such a situation—a change in times and focus? Why
not return power to the state legislatures where individuals, through local
175

Amar, supra note 33, at 109.
Id. at 106.
177
See id. at 108 (“At the Founding, a standing army in peacetime was viewed with dread and
seen as Others—mercenaries, convicts, vagrants, aliens—rather than ordinary citizens. Today, we view
our professional armed forces with pride.”).
178
See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 209 (“We might argue today about what sort of weapons are
protected [by the Second Amendment]. It is not clear that such provisions would today protect the
private ownership of Saturday night specials, assault rifles (however Congress might define them),
submachine guns, sawed-off shotguns, bazookas, or flamethrowers. But, whatever fell in or out of the
protected arena, the constitutional principle of private ownership of weapons would have been clear.
Had Congress added these provisions to the Bill of Rights, we would also have a very different country
than we have today, assuming, of course, that we still would have a country.”).
179
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
176
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democracy, have a voice in the interpretation, and creation, of gun
regulations? Why not Article V?
IV. THE SECOND AMENDMENT COMES OF AGE
“Scarcely any political question arises in the United States . . . that is
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.”180 In 2008, the U.S.
Supreme Court broke its nearly seventy-year silence regarding the Second
Amendment.181 Not since the 1930s, when the Court had limited the
Second Amendment to communal militia service, had the Court
reconsidered its unaltered interpretation.182 And, with few notable
exceptions, courts reviewing the right to keep and bear arms ruled that the
Founders intended a constrained right to arms generally, if not exclusively,
attached to militia service. It was inconsequential whether the question
involved weaponry (only weaponry connected to militia service was
protected)183 or activity (only activity relating to militia service was
protected);184 courts universally gave a very limited view of the Framers’
intentions. There was a clear and consistent pattern: the right to keep and
bear arms was not a free-standing individual right but unequivocally
conjoined with militia service.185
The winds of change began to blow when Justice Thomas authored a
concurring opinion in Printz v. United States.186 Printz addressed the
constitutionality, under the Tenth Amendment, of the Brady Act, a federal
gun law that required local law enforcement to perform background checks
on gun purchasers during the interim period before the national instant

180
Alpheus Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. REV. 385, 385 (1969)
(quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
181
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
182
See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“The Constitution as originally adopted
granted to the Congress power . . . ‘[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . .
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)).
183
See id. (“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that
this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the
common defense.” (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840))).
184
See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (“It is undoubtedly true that all citizens
capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as
well as of the States . . . .”).
185
See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (“With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of such [militia] forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second
Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”).
186
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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187

background check became operational.
Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, found the law violated federalism principles by improperly
commandeering local law enforcement to administer a federal program.188
The Second Amendment was neither argued nor litigated, but it
nonetheless came of age in this opinion.189 Justice Thomas’s dicta proved
a harbinger of things to come:
Even if we construe Congress’ authority to regulate interstate
commerce to encompass those intrastate transactions that
“substantially affect” interstate commerce, I question
whether Congress can regulate the particular [gun purchase]
transactions at issue here. The Constitution, in addition to
delegating certain enumerated powers to Congress, places
whole areas outside the reach of Congress’ regulatory
authority. . . . The Second Amendment similarly appears to
contain an express limitation on the Government’s authority.
That Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” This
Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of
the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment.
If, however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a
personal right to “keep and bear arms,” a colorable argument
exists that the Federal Government’s regulatory scheme, at
least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession
of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment’s
protections. . . . Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will
have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was
correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms “has justly
been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a
republic.”190
Prior to Justice Thomas’s concurrence, the only changes between the
Court’s 1939 opinion in United States v. Miller191 and 2008 appeared to be
an increased scholarly push toward adopting the individual rights model192
187

Id. at 902.
See id. at 933 (“‘The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.’ The [Brady Act’s] mandatory obligation imposed on [state law
enforcement officers] to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs
afoul of that rule.” (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992))).
189
See id. at 938–39 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As the parties did not raise this [Second
Amendment] argument . . . we need not consider it here.”).
190
Id. at 937–39 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
191
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
192
See Ehrman & Henigen, supra note 50, at 6 (“The argument that the constitution is a barrier to
stronger gun laws has received support in recent years from articles appearing in various legal
188
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193

and a conservative shift in the Court’s membership. In fact, in 1983, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case nearly identical to McDonald v.
Chicago.194 At that time, not a single Justice felt the need to revisit Miller
or overturn the Seventh Circuit’s holding that “[b]ecause the second
amendment is not applicable to [the states] and because possession of
handguns by individuals is not part of the right to keep and bear arms, [the
Morton Grove Ordinance did] not violate the second amendment.”195
Instead, the Supreme Court in a single sentence denied review.196 Miller
was still the law of the land.
Between 1983 and 1997, when Printz was decided, the Supreme
Court’s composition changed dramatically. Six new Justices would join
the Court. The first change was the appointment of Associate Justice
Antonin Scalia.197 The next appointment was Associate Justice Anthony
Kennedy, who, like Justice Scalia, was appointed by Republican President
Ronald Reagan.198 The next two Justices, appointed by Republican
President George Herbert Walker Bush, were Associate Justices David
Souter and Clarence Thomas, respectively.199
Finally, Democratic
President William Jefferson Clinton appointed two new members to the
Court, Associate Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.200
The appointment of these six new Justices changed two-thirds of the
Court’s membership. Thus, it is not surprising that this new combination
would prompt significant constitutional changes. The most noteworthy
publications which conclude that the second amendment guarantees a broad, individual right to own
firearms for lawful private purposes in the same way that the first amendment guarantees individual
rights of free speech, religion, and assembly.”). Ehrman and Henigen’s article even predates the
plethora of recent scholarship, including that which is self-described as the “standard model” mantra.
193
See Merkel, supra note 35, at 697 (predicting, in 2006, that the appointment of Justices
Roberts and Alito would “make it more likely, perhaps all but certain, that a definitive Supreme Court
opinion guaranteeing a private right to arms under the Second Amendment [would] issue within a few
years”). With the Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald, Merkel’s prescient forecast came true
both in time and substance. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist warned against such a “living
Constitution” approach, reminding that the nature of the Constitution “was designed to enable the
popularly elected branches of government, not the judicial branch, to keep the country abreast of the
times.” Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 699 (emphasis added). Perhaps Justice Rehnquist’s reluctance to
modernize gun rights explains why the Roberts Court, rather than the Rehnquist Court, first took up the
issue.
194
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
195
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
196
Quilici, 464 U.S. 863.
197
Justice Scalia took his judicial oath of office on September 26, 1986. Biographies of Current
Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.asp
x (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
198
Justice Kennedy took his judicial oath of office on February 18, 1988. Id.
199
Justice Souter took his judicial oath of office on October 9, 1990. Justice Thomas took his
judicial oath of office on October 23, 1991. Id.
200
Justice Ginsburg took her judicial oath of office on August 10, 1993. Justice Breyer took his
judicial oath of office on August 3, 1994. Id.
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change, in relation to the Second Amendment, was Justice Thomas’s
revitalization of the previously discarded individual rights view.201 Justice
Thomas captured much of the burgeoning “standard model” scholarship in
his Printz footnote: “Marshaling an impressive array of historical evidence,
a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the ‘right to keep
and bear arms’ is, as the Amendment’s text suggests, a personal right.”202
Justice Thomas, deliberately or not, galvanized the Second Amendment’s
rebirth.
A mere twelve years later, Justice Thomas and the “standard model”
would prevail in a much more meaningful decision. In 2008, the Supreme
Court in District of Columbia v. Heller veered far from an originalist
approach and nearly two centuries of jurisprudence in finding the Second
Amendment’s “central” protection was the individual right to maintain a
handgun in the home for personal self-defense purposes.203 This holding is
remarkable when one considers the nearly uninterrupted history of courts,
both state and federal, finding that the “central” focus of the Second
Amendment was militia service and militia weaponry.204 Handguns would
have been unknown to the Founders whose world was dominated—at least
from the modern perspective—by antiquated weaponry that was large and
clumsy and required gunpowder and musket balls for operation.205 And, to
aid in “self-defense,” colonial America preferred disarmament and
proscriptions against weaponry as opposed to arming the entire
populace.206
Cases prior to Heller routinely considered the Second Amendment
limited, at its core, to military weaponry connected to militia service.207
Self-defense was never considered by eighteenth-, nineteenth-, or
twentieth-century courts to be a motivating feature, or core purpose of the
Second Amendment.208 Thus, Justice Scalia’s rejection of originalism is
201

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937–39 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 938 n.2.
203
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
204
See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (2000) (“If there is such a thing as settled constitutional law, the Second
Amendment may have been its quintessential example.”); see also Farber, supra note 46, at 180
(“Justice Scalia has also stressed stare decisis as a limit on originalism. Despite originalism’s centrality
in his thinking about judicial review, it plays little role in some of Justice Scalia’s most notable
opinions.”).
205
See Clayton Cramer, Colonial Firearms Regulation, 16 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16
(2004) (discussing colonists’ use of muskets in early frontier battles).
206
See supra note Part II.
207
The one major, and modern, exception was United States v. Emerson, which held that the
Second Amendment “protects the right of individuals to privately keep and bear their own firearms that
are suitable as individual, personal weapons.” 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
208
But see Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I):
Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self–Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 623,
202
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209

notable, particularly in light of his own writing that the only true voice to
constitutional interpretation is originalism.210 Equally troubling is the
Court’s slim majority opinion that casts a clear deviation from past
jurisprudence.211 What the majority follows is not precedent, but rather,
641–43 (2012) (discussing different state court treatments of Second Amendment rights in the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries). Professor Merkel expresses frustration:
[T]hose who call themselves originalist (or even textualists), those who base the
legitimacy of the interpretation they offer on its alleged fidelity to a past
understanding, place themselves under an obligation to advance an account of that
past understanding that is not demonstrably counter-factual, naïve, or absurd, and
that this holds whether one’s perspective is essentially elitist (framer-focused) or
popular (We the People-focused).
Merkel, supra note 35, at 686.
209
See Honorable Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way, Remarks
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005), available
at http://cfif.org/htdocs/legal_issues/legal_updates/us_supreme_cour/scalia-constitutional-speech.htm
(discussing his rejection of the label “strict constructionist”). In his comments, Justice Scalia explains
what “originalism” means:
I am one of a small number of judges, small number of anybody—judges,
professors, lawyers—who are known as originalists. Our manner of interpreting the
Constitution is to begin with the text, and to give that text the meaning that it bore
when it was adopted by the people.
Id. Scalia was quite direct in explaining how non-originalist judges previously explained their
deviation from originalism: “[P]rior to the advent of the ‘Living Constitution,’ judges did their
distortions the good old fashioned way, the honest way—they lied about it. They said the Constitution
means such and such, when it never meant such and such.” Id. These comments appear rather ironic
following the Court’s holding in Heller, which most historians (the individuals Justice Scalia usually
informs us are best suited to aid in interpretations) reject on historical grounds. See Saul Cornell,
Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56
UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1112–13 (2009) (rejecting the claim that historical evidence shows that the
forefathers supported an individual rights component to the Second Amendment).
210
See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 90 (discussing Scalia’s embrace of a living Constitution in
Heller).
211
Every federal circuit, except the Second and Fifth Circuits, had found that the Second
Amendment protected a collective right for individuals relating to militia service. See United States v.
Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Miller Court assigned no special importance to the
character of the weapon itself, but instead demanded a reasonable relationship between its ‘possession
or use’ and militia-related activity.” (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939))); Love
v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he lower federal courts have uniformly held that
the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right.”); United States v. Warin,
530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (“It is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective
rather than an individual right.”); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (“[U]nder
the Second Amendment, the federal government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single
individual as well as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession or use of any
weapon which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia.”); accord United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting, like
previous 10th Circuit panels, the “time worn” challenge to felon in possession statutes because no
federal criminal gun-control could be said to violate the Second Amendment unless it “impair[s] the
state’s ability to maintain a well-regulated militia”); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th
Cir. 2000) (“Recent scholarship, however, does not provide a sufficient basis for overruling an earlier
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the burgeoning scholarship calling for an individual right to “keep and bear
arms.” This type of analysis, embracing the “living Constitution,” is
precisely the analytical framework that the Heller five-member majority
would usually reject and ridicule.212 But, in fairness, the dissent embraces
an anti-individual rights approach that is unfamiliar to their usual
jurisprudence. Heller clearly demonstrates the mischief that can occur
when nine unelected Justices are permitted to define, or delimit, the
individual rights emanating from the penumbras of the Constitution.
A similar dilemma is posed by the Court’s 2010 plurality decision in
McDonald v. City of Chicago.213 For the first time, the Court found the
Second Amendment was intended to be fully incorporated to apply to the
individual states.214 While four members of the Court found the right
incorporated under Due Process,215 Justice Thomas would have expanded
application of the right through the Privileges and Immunities Clause.216
decision of this Court.”); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“Whatever questions remain unanswered, Miller and its progeny do confirm that the Second
Amendment establishes no right to possess a firearm apart from the role possession of the gun might
play in maintaining a state militia.”); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“[I]n order to claim Second Amendment protection, Wright must demonstrate a reasonable
relationship between his possession of the machineguns and pipe bombs and ‘the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia.’” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178)); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d
98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We follow our sister circuits in holding that the Second Amendment is a right
held by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a private citizen.”); United States
v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Considering this history, we cannot conclude that the
Second Amendment protects the individual possession of military weapons . . . . The rule emerging
from Miller is that, absent a showing that the possession of a certain weapon has ‘some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,’ the Second Amendment does
not guarantee the right to possess the weapon.” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178)); United States v.
Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (“Defendant presents a long historical analysis of the
amendment’s background and purpose from which he concludes that every citizen has the absolute
right to keep arms. This broad conclusion has long been rejected.” (citing Miller, 307 U.S. 174)).
212
See Laurence H. Tribe, Approaches to Constitutional Analysis, in AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y
FOR LAW & POLICY, IT IS A CONSTITUTION WE ARE EXPOUNDING: COLLECTED WRITINGS ON
INTERPRETING OUR FOUNDING DOCUMENT 26 (2009) (discussing the importance of starting with the
Constitution’s “original meaning”). Professor Tribe explains “[o]riginal meaning as [a] starting point”:
Regardless of how committed one might be to the notion of the Constitution as fluid
and evolving, it seems clear that interpretation of its provisions—or, indeed, of its
design—must at least begin with the question of what those provisions, or that
design, meant at the time when they were conceived and, later, at the time they
became law. Absent some extremely persuasive justification, it would be
nonsensical to begin by treating a phrase in the Constitution as meaning one thing
when, to those who wrote or ratified or read it at the time, it would have meant
something entirely different.
Id.
213

130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
Id. at 3026.
215
Id. at 3030–31.
216
Id. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
214
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Even casual observers of the Court would recognize McDonald as an
extremely fractured opinion, with five individual Justices writing opinions
amassing 111 total pages.217 Such opinions, regardless of topic, underscore
the reality that many of our individual rights are tenuously held, or upheld,
by slim majorities on the Supreme Court. Rather than strengthen Heller
and a law-abiding individual’s right to possess firearms McDonald may
simply have exposed the fragile nature of existing Second Amendment
jurisprudence.
Much like Heller, the McDonald decision breaks new ground that may
be due as much to Court composition as judicial doctrine.218 The Supreme
Court had past opportunities to incorporate the Second Amendment but did
not. The most notable of these occasions occurred in 1983 when the Court
refused to reconsider Miller,219 Presser v. Illinois,220 and United States v.
Cruikshank221 in the Seventh Circuit decision, Quilici v. Village of Morton
Grove.222 Many of these past opinions, excepting Quilici, would have been
much closer and contemporaneous to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment than the twenty-first-century cases handed down by a
conservative Court.223 Yet, there is little doubt that a post-Fourteenth
Amendment Constitution values individual rights where such rights are
integral to liberty and freedom.224 The starting point for evaluating
individual rights begins with history.225 But, the key inquiry is whether a
217
Id. at 3026 (plurality opinion). The five opinions span 111 pages in the Supreme Court
Reporter, which will likely yield even greater density in the forthcoming U.S. Reports. Justice Alito
wrote a twenty-five page opinion for the plurality. Justices Scalia (nine pages) and Thomas (thirty-one
pages) both authored concurring opinions. And, following their dissents in Heller, both Justice Stevens
(thirty-three pages) and Justice Breyer (seventeen pages) drafted dissenting opinions in McDonald.
218
Writing for the plurality, Justice Alito explains: “[i]n sum, it is clear that the Framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” Id. at 3042. Thus, following
McDonald, individuals are given a substantive due process right to possess weaponry for self-defense
purposes subject to the still undefined instances where the right does not exist for everyone.
219
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
220
116 U.S. 252 (1886).
221
92 U.S. 542 (1875).
222
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983).
223
See, e.g., Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir.
1992) (“The Supreme Court . . . has held that the Second Amendment constrains only the actions of
Congress, not the states.”); Dabbs v. State, 39 Ark. 353, 356 (1882) (interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment’s application narrowly to the freed slave population and similarly finding no violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause); Strickland v. State, 72 S.E. 260, 263
(Ga. 1911) (reminding that the Supreme Court had found—very near in time to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification—that the Second Amendment “was a restriction upon the power of Congress
only”).
224
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (reminding the Due Process Clause
“provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty Interests”).
225
Id. at 710.
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particular right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that
“neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”226
While history is on the side of case law preceding Heller and
McDonald, a modern individual-rights focused Constitutional paradigm
has been building since the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut.227 Ironically, the opponents of an individual right to bear
arms for purposes of self-defense and handgun possession usually align
themselves with the more liberal approach to constitutional interpretation
and celebrate such individual rights as abortion, same-sex intimacy, and an
expansive right to privacy.228 Yet, in what has become somewhat common
for the Court, Justices (and scholars) transpose their usual alliances for a
more historically-grounded and legally-narrow interpretive philosophy
when the result is politically desirable.229 When it comes to guns,
traditional liberal interpretations were jettisoned by the dissenting Justices
in the name of historical fidelity.230 Such juxtaposition of usual
Constitutional interpretation gives this author pause. How can lawful gun
owners be certain that a majority of Justice will side with them on larger
issues, such as open-carry laws or background checks?
Heller and McDonald give ample reason to remove the Justices from

226

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(first espousing a Constitutional “right” of
privacy).
228
See Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(explaining that some judges are able to find individual rights in other amendments but fail to find such
rights within the Second Amendment). The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear Silveira en banc,
and the denial contained four dissenting opinions. Id. at 568. Judge Kozinski’s opinion, much like
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Printz, provided much needed traction for the “individual
rights” movement. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938–39 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing that, up until that point, the Court had not been presented with the “opportunity to
determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms ‘has justly been
considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic’”). Judge Kozinski criticized the irony in his
liberal colleagues pushing for a narrow view of the Second Amendment by observing that “[j]udges
know very well how to read the Constitution broadly when they are sympathetic to the right being
asserted.” Silveira, 328 F.3d at 568 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). He continued, “But, as the panel
[below] aptly demonstrates, when we’re none too keen on a particular constitutional guarantee, we can
be equally ingenious in burying language that is incontrovertibly there.” Id.
229
See Silveira, 328 F.3d at 569 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (providing a historical synopsis of
disarmament). Judge Kozinski elaborated:
227

The able judges of the panel majority are usually very sympathetic to individual
rights, but they have succumbed to the temptation to pick and choose. Had they
brought the same generous approach to the Second Amendment that they routinely
bring to the First, Fourth and selected potions of the Fifth, they would have had no
trouble finding an individual right to bear arms.
Id.
230
See Levinson, supra note 17, at 643, 645–50 (applying Philip Bobbitt’s historical modality of
constitutional interpretation analysis to the Second Amendment).
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231

the gun-rights equation.
Following these decisions we are left with no
clear constitutional standard of review, no clear explication of the Second
Amendment’s parameters, and no clear juridical basis for the Court’s
respective holdings. Heller tells us that despite the clarity of language and
purpose in the prefatory clause, the “well regulated militia” was never
intended to be the “central” purpose of the Second Amendment.232
McDonald informs us that despite Presser and Cruikshank’s proximity to
the Fourteenth Amendment, the modern incorporation doctrine demands
the Second Amendment be applied to the states as a fundamental right.233
Perhaps the rights of the people, with both “rights” and “people” being
now far more broadly construed than during the colonial period, should be
reconsidered. Our constitutional approach to rights, whether they be gun
rights or abortion rights, are too far removed from the Founders’ world to
credibly interpret either their original intent or textual objectives. And, the
Fourteenth Amendment, completely unknown to the Founders, has
transformed our entire Constitutional democracy. The time has come for a
new approach, one that the Founders provided to allow for a living
231
See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary
Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 247 (2012) (remarking, two years after McDonald and only four
years after Heller, that the Second Amendment “is now part of ‘normal constitutional law,’ which is to
say that discussion about its meaning has moved from the question of whether it means anything at all,
to a well-established position that it protects an individual right, and is enforceable as such against both
states and the federal government” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). It is remarkable that less than
five years after the Court completely changed course on an extremely settled Second Amendment
interpretation, an esteemed constitutional law scholar would suggest that this nascent right established
by a slim 5–4 majority is now somehow “well-established.” This author would argue that not only is
the right not well-established, it is equally not well-supported in history or law.
232
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). However, as articulated in Heller:

It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause
announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of
the militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the
only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even
more important for self-defense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal
Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the
reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written
Constitution. Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-defense is merely a
“subsidiary interest” of the right to keep and bear arms is profoundly mistaken. He
bases that assertion solely upon the prologue—but that can only show that selfdefense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the central component of
the right itself.
Id at 599.
233
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (“In Heller, we held that the
Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.
Unless considerations of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects
a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government
and the States. We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.” (citation omitted)).
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Constitution: the Article V Amendment process. The time has come for
us to amend the Second Amendment to ensure that lawful gun owners do
not see their rights proscribed, or constricted, by a slim majority of
Supreme Court Justices.
V. THE TIME HAS COME TO REPLACE 27 WITH 28
“The most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning
of a law [is to inquire into] the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which
moved the legislator to enact it. For when this reason ceases, the law itself
ought likewise to cease with it.”235 Much like Jonathon Swift before me,
though lacking his literary grace, I feel compelled to put forth a modest
proposal to amend the Second Amendment so as to strengthen its
presumed protections.236 Before opposing this novel approach, I would
suggest that perhaps the proposal is neither as desperate nor as aspirational
as it seems. Article V permits the best solution for our Second
Amendment dilemma—a dilemma that is crippling our legislators,
clogging our courts, hamstringing our cities, and making it increasingly
difficult for lawful gun owners to securely assert their individual rights.
Article V permits us to amend the Second Amendment to replace it with
something much more applicable to our modern times. Rather than stray
willfully, or ignorantly, from the Founders’ Second Amendment, it is time
to stand up and call for real change, real substance, and meaningful action.
It is time to replace the Second Amendment’s twenty-seven words with a
new and improved Twenty-Eighth Amendment that focuses on the right of
law-abiding citizens to retain their guns free from unnecessary
governmental intrusion or interference.
I hereby propose that the Second Amendment be amended in the
following manner:
PROPOSAL: Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution
Sec. 1: The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby replaced immediately with this new

234

See supra note 5 (discussing the Article V amendment process).
Cornell, supra note 99, at 576 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 60 (George Sharswood ed., 1895)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236
See generally JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL (1729) (proposing a solution “for
preventing the children of poor people in Ireland[] from being a burden to their parents or county, and
for making them beneficial to the publick” by selling a large portion of its children to be consumed as
food).
235
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237

Amendment.

Sec. 2: Congress shall make no law regulating or otherwise
restricting the use, ownership or transfer of guns and
weaponry.238 Congress retains, however, the sole power to
regulate and restrict all weaponry intended for military use,
including tanks, drones, bombs, and fully automatic guns and
weaponry.239 No such restriction or regulation may be made
on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religious
heritage.240
Sec. 3: Existing federal gun control laws regulating felons
in possession or persons under indictment for domestic
violence are not affected by this Amendment. Such existing
laws remain valid, but no new regulations may be initiated at
the federal level except as provided in Section 2 of this
Amendment.
Sec. 4: Each State has the power to regulate or restrict the
use, ownership, and transfer of all non-military style
weaponry, including all semi-automatic guns, within its
borders.241 No such restriction or regulation may be made on
237
This is the same formula used in the Twenty-First Amendment when the Eighteenth
Amendment was repealed and replaced. I would recommend following the same, though admittedly
remarkable, precedent. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
238
This Congressional exemption relating to weaponry is similar to the Commerce Clause
exemption granted to the states for alcohol regulation, an Article otherwise subject to interstate
commerce regulation, under the Twenty-First Amendment. See id. § 2.
239
This provision ensures that only the federal government would have the power or authority to
possess certain military weapons that were never intended to be in private hands. In some measure, this
provision comports with existing Second Amendment case law—at least case law relating to the
Founders’ Second Amendment—that military weaponry can be removed from pure individual pursuits
and remain connected to the civic role of military/militia service. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d
1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Second Amendment is a “collective right” for states to
maintain a militia and not a “protection for the individual’s right to bear arms”); Silveira v. Lockyer,
312 F.3d 1052, 1087 (2002), abrogated by United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that California could regulate or prohibit assault weapons). The provision may prove
controversial, however, as this section places solely in Congress’s jurisdiction the power to regulate, or
even proscribe, military-style high capacity guns.
240
This provision, coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment, should prevent any return to the
Black Codes or days when Native Americans were denied access to guns in order to further the then
existing white social order. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 39, at 323–27 (discussing the colonial
American history of white settlers arming themselves to maintain control over slaves and to protect
against attacks from Native Americans).
241
This approach merely returns us to the period prior to McDonald, when individual states were
permitted to regulate, and even restrict, certain weaponry. Admittedly, this provision is far broader
than the post-Heller and McDonald opinions, as this provision would permit a complete ban on nonmilitary weaponry, even for self-defense purposes. This section allows each state to determine for
itself what rights and regulations, if any, should exist in relation to weaponry.
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Sec. 5: This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by
conventions in the several States, as provided in the
Constitution, within seven years from the date of the
submission hereof to the States by Congress.243
Many who read this proposal will respond viscerally contending that
such option is outrageous or unnecessary. Such reflexive reaction is shortsighted and fails to appreciate the dangers of continuing to rely upon an
unelected Supreme Court for periodic direction on gun rights. Those who
claim an individual “right” in the constitutional sense to keep and use a
gun for hunting, self-defense, or other purposes, will not likely want to
evaluate a new approach to gun rights. Why should they? The current
Supreme Court appears likely to continue giving some, still unclear,
protection to gun owners and gun rights. But, the Court’s composition is
bound to change, and soon. The problem with relying on the fluid
dynamics of the Supreme Court is that today’s majority can quickly
become tomorrow’s dissent. The Court’s balance of ideological power
appears split 5 to 4. This is a fragile and vulnerable majority. Thus, any
change in membership could return our country to the Second
Amendment’s previous interpretation consistently advanced until Heller
and McDonald. The age of several of the Justices suggests retirements
could be eminent.
The Founders recognized that in order for their Constitution to survive
generations, an adaptive, modernizing tool was necessary. Article V, the
Amendment process, was provided to deal with changing conditions like
those facing the Second Amendment. No longer is the focus a militia that
needs to be poised to protect us. No longer do we fear a standing army as
the threat to our liberty and security, but rather, we celebrate the world’s
greatest military and its ability to protect our many freedoms. While many
still understandably fear tyranny or the threat that government tyranny
could compromise our liberties, another threat is the uncertain precedent
regarding guns. Regulations will continue to plague lawful gun owners.
And, calls for limits to the number of concealed carry licenses, open carry
242
This provision, which is identical to that provided in Section 2 of this proposed amendment,
see supra text accompanying note 240, ensures that there shall be no return to the Black Codes or days
where Native Americans were denied access to guns in order to further the then existing white social
order. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
243
This is the identical language pulled from the Twenty-First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI, § 3. While this author does not prefer one method of ratification over another as provided by
Article V, the language selected for this proposal comes directly from the only other Amendment that
both repealed and replaced another Amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. V (discussing the two methods
of ratifying an amendment).

2014]

A RETURN TO THE STATES’ RIGHTS MODEL

1509

opposition, background checks and other restrictive laws will continue to
proliferate. Our Second Amendment rights are currently in the hands of a
very divided Supreme Court.
The Second Amendment, as currently written, no longer provides
adequate protection to lawful gun owners. Rather than completely
abandon our Constitution, we have the ability to restructure these
protections in a manner more likely to protect our modern lives and our
law-abiding citizens. Or we can continue to rely on the Supreme Court and
its vacillating membership to expound and modernize the Constitution,
always hoping that the Justices sharing our ideological viewpoint remain in
the majority. Heller and McDonald are literally a single judicial
appointment away from reversal.
The more predictable approach, Article V’s constitutional amendment
process, is also the more difficult path. The Founders wanted the
Constitution to be difficult to alter and, thus, ensured that any amendment
would need to receive massive legislative and state support.244 That is not
to say that this solution is impossible or ill-conceived. This author
wholeheartedly believes that the time has come to modernize protection for
our gun rights, both collectively and individually, in a meaningful manner.
Let us return the “right” to the states to implement their traditional police
power to keep their citizenry safe. Let us return to direct democracy.
Much like capital punishment, gay marriage, and other controversial
topics, the better approach may be to return the power of regulation to the
states—the precise location the Founders would have, and did, approve.
An Article V amendment is distinct from calling a full-fledged
Article V convention, something this author currently opposes,245 but an
option that Second Amendment scholars like Glenn T. Reynolds and
Sanford Levinson welcome for other potential amendments.246 No doubt
about it, an Article V amendment (in the singular) would be revolutionary.
Few amendments have occurred outside the founding amendments and the
Civil War amendments.247 The time has come to once again amend our
244

U.S. CONST. art. V.
See generally Mary Margaret Penrose, Conventional Wisdom: Acknowledging Uncertainty in
the Unknown, 78 TENN. L. REV. 789 (2011) (presenting the uncertainties surrounding the process of the
untested Article V state convention process).
246
See Sanford Levinson, Afterword: Full of Sound and Fury but Signifying Relatively Little?, 78
TENN. L. REV. 867, 869 (2011) (“One might agree that explicit ‘amendatory adaptation’ is better than
‘amendment by latitudinarian interpretation,’ but . . . a significant deficiency of the United States
Constitution is that it is quite literally the most difficult to amend constitution in the entire world.”);
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Foreword: Divine Operating System?, 78 TENN. L. REV. 651, 653 (2011)
(“[T]he Constitution has been effectively amended by judicial interpretations on numerous occasions
. . . . If the Republic can face the risks of amendment via judicial action with equanimity, it can surely
face the risks inherent in amendment via the procedures of Article V.”).
247
See Timothy Lynch, Amending Article V to Make the Constitutional Amendment Process Itself
Less Onerous, 78 TENN. L. REV. 823, 824 (2011) (“Over the past 224 years, the Constitution has been
245
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Constitution. The time has come to take twenty-seven words and turn
them in to the Twenty-Eighth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: AN IDEA THAT
HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS
“The text of the Second Amendment is maddeningly ambiguous.”248
Americans are a curious lot. We remain profoundly inconsistent in our
support of an eighteenth-century Constitution that many criticize as
outdated and incapable of responding to our modern needs such as
abortion, gay marriage, and other issues.249 And, yet, we criticize the
interpretation of this Constitution when federal courts, often including our
Supreme Court, act to either find, or define, an individual right, such as the
current trend of federal courts sanctioning same-sex marriage, that is at
clear odds with state legislative pronouncements. Under the status quo, we
rely on an unelected Supreme Court to continually breathe life into this
document, always remembering it is a Constitution they are expounding.250
And many who criticize the Court speak of it as an activist body—a group
of politically appointed judges that serve life terms often in anonymity.
But, why wait for the Supreme Court to expound when we have the power
to improve?251 Why rely on nine voices when we can include the voices of
millions? The Founders provided us a viable solution in Article V—a
solution we have used to give us the Fourteenth Amendment, among
others.
All would hopefully admit that we will never be able to discern, with
finality or confidence, what the Founders truly meant when crafting this
singularly eternal document. So why is it so difficult to envision a new
Second Amendment, one that considers a world where blacks can never
again be slaves, where Indians hold citizenship, and where women have
rights outside the home and marriage? Why do Americans fear
abandoning this archaic Second Amendment in hopes of securing the
elusive meanings of yesterday when we should be focusing on the
amended seventeen times.”). The Civil War Amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments—were ratified in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively. Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/com
mon/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
248
Winkler, supra note 90.
249
See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Op-Ed., Let’s Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2012, at A19 (arguing that Americans’ “insisten[t] . . . obedience to the Constitution” is the
“culprit” causing American political dysfunction).
250
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that it
is a constitution we are expounding.”).
251
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). Article V, if properly utilized, will help delimit
the expounding needed by our ever-changing Supreme Court.
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certainties of individual rights for law-abiding gun owners that exist and
deserve protecting today? The truth is that our Second Amendment is still
vulnerable to judicial review and restriction. The Founders could never
have envisioned the world we live in and our modern conveniences,
ranging from travel to communication to weaponry. The political
discourse was limited to the Federalist Papers and pamphlets while ours is
expanded by Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and 24-hour news media.
Their Second Amendment is not suited for drones, M-4s, and nuclear arms
any more than our defense is dependent upon militias, muskets, and
flintlocks.
The Founders lived in a world without a professional police force and
without the nation’s strongest army literally deployed throughout the
world. The Founders had slaves and plantations. Modern Americans have
email, DVRs, and unparalleled amenities. Our worlds are so distinct that
their concerns cannot possibly be our concerns. The fears that motivated
the Founders, such as the fear of a standing army, give modern Americans
comfort and pride as we support our troops stationed across the globe. We
are much more than distant cousins; we are literally worlds apart.
The time has come; in fact the time has passed, to reevaluate the
Second Amendment and its applicability to the modern world. We need a
new, predictable way to protect the rights of law-abiding individuals to
own and use guns.
This author believes that we should consider using Article V to
reformulate the Founders’ Second Amendment into a more workable
modern amendment unquestionably securing the rights of lawful gun
owners. This author further believes that this amendment process should
take place through the Article V process, firmly placed in the state
legislative bodies rather than the continued refinement of gun rights, and
other individual rights “expounded” through judicial review.
The time has come to consider using the Article V process to replace
the Second Amendment with a states’ rights approach. The proposal seeks
to enhance, rather than limit, law-abiding citizens’ rights to continue to
own and use guns for hunting and self-protection. The proposal is most
decidedly individual and states’ rights focused. At its core, this proposal
considers who is best suited to determine what regulations, if any, should
be applied to lawful gun ownership. Should that power be placed with the
state or federal government? This author has less confidence in the
Supreme Court than in the individual state legislatures. Based on this
belief, it is time to draft a modern Second Amendment that completely
removes any notation to the militia and returns the power of regulation to
the individual states. Only in this way can we be confident that lawful gun
ownership will remain a viable individual right in this country.

